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I. Introduction
The traditional business records exception to the hearsay rule is
based upon the recognition of two practicalities: Necessity and reliance.
Shop books as evidence are thought necessary for adjudication on the
merits: unless business records can be used in court without the testi-
mony of every employee involved in the transaction, no one need ever
satisfy obligations to large or complex firms.1 Moreover, records are
seen as reliable evidence because of the business community's day-to-
day reliance on them. This inference of trustworthiness or reliability
makes sense with traditional leatherbound shop books, in part because
the opposing party is thought to have a reasonable opportunity to un-
cover errors and deletions.
But does the same inference make sense with computerized record-
keeping and accounting systems? This question deserves attention not
only because most business records are now computerized, but also be-
cause our reliance on computers belies the lingering mystification of
electronic data processing2 and the questionable reliability of its out-
put-whether the output be an erroneous monthly credit statement 3 or
the false reports generated in the Equity Funding fraud.4 Should courts
continue to infer trustworthiness simply from the traditional elements
of the shop-book rule, or should proof of computer system reliability
constitute part of a more comprehensive foundation for qualifying com-
puterized business records?
Certainly the practicalities that engendered the business record ex-
1. The classic statement of the necessity argument for the business records excep-
tion is found in Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Norwich Pharmaceutical Co., 18 F.2d
934, 937 (2d Cir. 1927) (L. Hand, J.).
2. See infra notes 214-23 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Swarens, 447 S.W.2d 53 (Ky. 1969).
4. R. LOEFFLER, REPORT OF THE TRUSTEE OF EQUITY FUNDING CORPORATION OF
AMERICA-PURSUANT TO 167(3) OF THE BANKRUPTCY AcT 88 (describing how false infor-
mation was generated by computer in order to perpetrate and then to obscure the Equity
Funding fraud); see also Allen, Embezzler's Guide to the Computer, HARV. BUS. REV.,
July-Aug. 1975, at 79.
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ception remain with us. Given their size, complexity, and geographic
dispersion, many businesses would face not only great expense but per-
haps the impossibility of proof without recourse to their computerized
information. Moreover, because of the business community's reliance
on computerized shop books, these books meet the traditional condi-
tions for circumstantial trustworthiness.
Although some commentators have expressed concern over the re-
liability of computerized business records,5 federal judges substantially
agree that computer output should be qualified like any other business
record, despite the fact that computer systems store, retrieve, and ma-
nipulate information in ways significantly different from earlier manual
or mechanical systems. This judicial consensus has evolved since the
passage of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.6 Before the passage
of the Rules, some courts required a more comprehensive foundation
for qualifying business records stored and maintained by computer.
More recently, all courts have required proponents to meet only the
business records standard, and thereby have required the objector to as-
sume the burden of persuading the trier of fact that such records lack
probative value.
Under the Rules, a trial court rarely excludes an offer of computer-
ized business records or reports not specially prepared for trial.7 More-
over, courts of appeals almost always uphold a lower court's finding of
proper foundation for computerized business records, even when the
lower court's finding is questionable.8 Appellate court opinions offer
two rationales for their rubberstamps of approval. First, they grant
trial judges broad discretion in admitting evidence. 9 Thus, the party op-
posing admission must carry the formidable burden of persuading an
appellate court that the trial court judge abused her discretion. Second,
federal judges define objections to admissibility as arguments about pro-
bative value.' 0 In practical terms, this means that the opponent is left
5. See, e.g., infra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
6. See infra text accompanying note 62 for excerpt of FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
7. See, e.g., Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 125 (2d Cir.) (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (distinguishing business records from documents specially pre-
pared for trial), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976). But see United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d
1228 (6th Cir. 1973) (treating an annual computer run as business record), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1157 (1974).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Fendley, 522 F.2d 181, 191 (5th Cir, 1975) (Godbold, J.,
dissenting).
9. See, e.g., United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982); D. BENDER, COMPUTER
LAW: EVIDENCE AND PROCEDURE 6-31 (1978).
10. United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982); Rosenberg v. Collins, 624 F.2d
659 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Scholle, 553 F.2d 1109 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
940 (1977). By probative valve, I mean argument to the trier of fact, after the evidence
already has been qualified, about the weight to be given the evidence.
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with a Sisyphean task-arguing that the judge erred in granting any
probative value to the business records and thus that she should not
have permitted the jury to consider them at all. Given the context of
trial court discretion, the probability of carrying that burden approaches
zero.
The authority for such appellate self-restraint, though familiar,
bears repetition. An ideological mandate for trial on the merits pro-
vides the framework for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure." Out-
comes based on technicalities are viewed as trickery. Given the
corollary that more evidence makes for a fairer trial, courts have inter-
preted the Federal Rules of Evidence according to a canonical presump-
tion in favor of admissibility. The hearsay rule, however, stands in
opposition to this canon. It constitutes the traditional presumption
against admissibility-that in order to evaluate a statement's credibility,
jurors must see the declarant speak. They must literally hear him say
his piece. A living, breathing person must submit to the ritual of
oathtaking and to the scrutiny of the jury. He must survive the ordeal
of cross-examination. 12 Documents are simply insufficient for these
purposes. Yet in recent years, exceptions have outflanked the hearsay
rule.'3 The proliferation of exceptions to the hearsay rule is consistent
with the notion that the courts can optimize fairness by maximizing the
amount of permissible evidence. In particular, the business record ex-
ception's single-handed overpowering of this exclusionary rule repre-
sents the triumph of the general presumption in favor of admissibility.
Although the judiciary's treatment of computerized records is sup-
ported by the general presumption in favor of admissibility, it is at odds
with the authoritative Manual for Complex Litigation (Manual),
promulgated by the Federal Judicial Center. 1 4 The Manual's recom-
mendations regarding a more comprehensive foundation occupy the
abandoned position taken by the pre-Rules opinions that expressed con-
cern over the reliability of computer data-even if qualified as business
records. 15 But is it reasonable to apply recommendations addressed to
complex litigation to all offers of computerized records? Does it make
any difference that under current law the objector rather than the of-
11. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1. By ideological, I mean a system of ideas and beliefs about
trial on the merits.
12. For a brief history of the rule against hearsay, see MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE
§§ 244-245 (E.W. Clary gen. ed. 3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MCCORMICK. For a more de-
tailed treatment, see 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1364 (J. Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974); see also
Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 288-91 (1972)
(Advisory Committee's discussion of the hearsay problem).
13. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 245, at 728-29. The best examples are FED.
R. EVID. 803(24), 804(5).
14. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (5th ed. 1982) [hereinafter MANUAL].
15. See infra notes 50-60 and accompanying text for discussion of pre-Rules opinions
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fering party must offer evidence of systemic unreliability? Does it mat-
ter that the courts are concerned with the probative value rather than
the admissibility of computerized records? If the question of reliability
is material, the issue certainly will be raised and argued under either
alternative.
In any case, significant consequences do arise from the courts' im-
posing on the objecting party the burden of disproving systemic reliabil-
ity after the computer data already have been qualified as business
records. 16 The presumption of trustworthiness simply carries too much
weight in our recently computerized society. Judges, juries, attorneys,
and parties cannot make sound judgments regarding the credibility of
computerized records by comparing fairly brief and understandable tes-
timony with recognizable documents, as they could with traditional
shop books. Unlike ledgers and books of payables and receivables with
individual items, intermediate accounts, and scrivened entries or
changes, computer printouts are not records at all, but rather neatly
packaged concatenations of information excerpted from numerous
records in multiple files. Because program changes or data manipula-
tions can be accomplished without leaving any trace and without affect-
ing the day-to-day operation of a computer system, both unintentional
error and intentional fraud are difficult to discover behind a perfect-
looking printout. Even if document discovery and deposition of data
processing personnel are forthcoming, 17 system examination may be too
expensive and time consuming, especially given the frequent confronta-
and infra notes 84-98 and accompanying text for discussion of the recommendations in
MANUAL, supra note 14, at §§ 2.711-.716.
After this article was written, the Federal Judicial Center published the MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND (1985) [hereinafter MANUAL, SECOND]. Although different
in form, the positions taken by the Manual, Second regarding the treatment of computer
data are substantially the same. See id. § 21.446, at 60-62. The revised discussion of com-
puter evidence problems is a shorthand rendition of the Manual's six recommendations.
See in fra notes 86, 88 & 90 and accompanying text. Nonetheless, I do take issue with
these changes, insofar as they seem to rest on an assumption that judges and counsel no
longer need the clarifying structure and explicit guidance of the Manual's fuller descrip-
tion of the computer evidence problem. Quite to the contrary, I believe that the case law
suggests that clarification and guidance are still called for.
16. Burdens of proof and presumptions encompass a complex subject area whose ter-
rain has been thoroughly explored in the legal literature. For an exhaustive bibliography,
see MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at 946 n.1. Although the analysis that follows does not
specify the nature of the burden to be carried--either producing' evidence or persuading
the trier of fact--one implication of maximizing admissible evidence would be to prefer
the heavier burden of persuasion. On the other hand, requiring the proponent of comput-
erized business records to carry either burden would be a step in the right direction.
17. For an excellent introduction to the problems of computer discovery, see Sher-
man & Kinnard, The Development, Discovery, and Use of Computer Support Systems in
Achieving Effuciency in Litigation, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1979); see also Fromholz, Dis-
covery, Evidentiary, Confldentiality and Security Problems Associated with the Use of
1986]
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tion between the individual objector and large firm or government
agency proponent. Computerization clearly magnifies the significance
of the evidential tenet that the proponent is in the best position to offer
proof about his own system's reliability because his personnel are al-
ready familiar with the machinery, programs, operation, and
documentation.' 8
Given the judiciary's perception that computerized records have an
aura of reliability as well as the broad discretion granted to trial court
judges regarding evidentiary questions, the current practice simply does
not accord the objecting party a fair chance to argue the reliability ques-
tion. Because more and better evidence is central to our fundamental
commitment to trials on the merits, 19 relying on business reliance is no
longer good enough. Rather, courts should apply to all computerized
records in all cases the Manual's recommendations for more compre-
hensive qualification and discovery. 20 In sum, a better court practice
would take more seriously the traditional policies in favor of requiring
in-court testimony to test trustworthiness-here, system reliability.2 '
This Article develops two rationales for an alternative approach to
computerized records, founded in the Manual's recommendations, that
better serves the Rules' overarching concern for fairness. The first ra-
tionale is a statutory-construction argument which demonstrates that
implemention of the Manual's recommendations engenders a more co-
herent interpretation of the Rules. In particular, the recommendations
reconstruct the proper relationship between the business records excep-
Computer-Based Litigation Support Systems, in THE COMPUTER FRAMEWORK FOR COM-
PLEX LITIGATION (1976).
18. The proponent is also in the best position to elicit testimony about his system's
reliability from a friendly third-party witness. For a discussion of the proponent's burden
of proving the traditional authentication question, see MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at
§§ 218-220. For a discussion of the reasons for creating presumptions, see id. § 343. For
the modern practice, see FED. R. EVID. 702, 901.
19. See FED. R. EVID. 102; FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
20. MANUAL, supra note 14, at §§ 2.711-.716.
21. Proof of system reliability as part of the foundation for qualifying computerized
business records can fall under either the hearsay exception, see FED. R. EVID. 803(6), or
under the authentication requirement, see FED. R. EVID. 901.
It may be argued that an expanded foundation for admitting computerized business
records into evidence, like the one proposed here, would have the undesirable effect of
significantly raising litigation costs. This concern is misplaced, because higher litigation
costs would turn out to be the exception, rather than the rule, for two reasons. First of
all, uncontested offers of computerized business records could be accomplished in much
the same way as they are currently-by stipulation of the parties. Second, although con-
tested offers might sometimes involve slightly higher costs on account of a modest in-
crease in the amount of evidence and testimony, the typical case would reflect, for the
most part, not an increase, but rather a shift of burden and some expense from the ob-
jecting to the offering party.
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tion and the authentication requirement.22
The second rationale is a pragmatic assessment of computer tech-
nology that shows why the Manual's approach of lawyerly skepticism
reflects more accurately our experience with computers and their limi-
tations. Specifically, this assessment examines system security and user
expertise within the context of small computer systems and computer
industry marketing practices and system conversion problems concern-
ing large systems.
To build a framework for the two rationales, part II of the Article
quickly sketches commentators' concerns about the treatment of com-
puterized business records. Next, part III explores the courts' doctrinal
split regarding the admissibility of computerized records under the
traditional shop-book rule, then questions the premise of business reli-
ance that underlies the current interpretation of the exception, and fi-
nally contrasts this current interpretation with the Manual's reliability-
based approach of demanding more discovery and a comprehensive
foundation for qualification as business records. Within that historical
and institutional context, part IV develops the Article's two rationales
and argues for the extension of the Manual's approach to all computer-
ized records. The argument in part IV is based on a close reading of the
Rules and on the practical limitations of computer systems. Part V con-
cludes with some observations about the questions of reliance and relia-
bility within the larger context of the longstanding jurisprudential
quest for objectivity in judicial interpretation.
II. Commentators' Dilemma About Computerized
Business Records
Simply encouraging the admission of more evidence cannot guaran-
tee due process, fair outcomes, or even better evidence. If maximizing
the amount of evidence advanced our fundamental commitment to fos-
tering trials on the merits, then having no rules of evidence would con-
stitute the most desirable state of affairs. But the idea of a fair trial is
complex, and its satisfaction is not determinable by mere reference to
the amount of evidence in the trial record. Enforcing the presumptive
exclusion of hearsay evidence still makes sense despite a general predis-
position to admit evidence because it appears to serve policies that we
think are important.23 This section discusses commentators' concerns
about computerized business records in order to dramatize the admissi-
bility dilemma arising from the need for such evidence on the one hand
and the uneasiness over questions of reliability on the other.
22. FED. R. EVID. 803(6), 901(b)(9).
23. This proposition is not an uncontroversial assumption. See, e.g., MCCORMICK,
supra note 12, at § 245.
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The traditional common-law rule excluding hearsay evidence and
the set of exceptions to the rule reflect a cluster of social policies.24 Our
skepticism regarding the truthfulness of out-of-court statements de-
mands the presence in court of the speaker or writer. According to Mc-
Cormick on Evidence (McCormick), the rule against hearsay evidence
derives from three factors upon which the credibility of testimony de-
pends: the witness' perception, memory, and narration. 25 The rule
against hearsay institutionalizes the conditions under which the testi-
mony's three dimensions can be tested. Those conditions are oath, per-
sonal presence at trial, and cross-examination. 26
There are numerous exceptions to the rule against hearsay. Each
exception is founded on some circumstantial assurance of trustworthi-
ness.27 The theory underlying the business records exception is similar
to the theory underlying other exceptions-unusual reliability, which is
inferred from the belief that regularly kept records have a high degree
of accuracy.28 Their very regularity and continuity are presumed to
train the recordkeeper in habits of precision. Moreover, financial
records periodically are balanced and audited. Finally, "the entire busi-
ness of the nation and many other activities function in reliance upon
records of this kind. '29  In short, not only do courts see the practice
and environment as encouraging the making of accurate records, but
they also rely upon business reliance.30 The courts' reliance on business
reliance has supported liberalized admissibility and has decreased for-
mal demands for assurances of trustworthiness. 31 The traditional com-
24. The exceptions under the Federal Rules of Evidence do not allow admission, but
rather negate exclusion. See FED. R. EVID. 803.
25. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 245, at 726.
26. Id. At least in criminal law cases, there is also the constitutional issue of confron-
tation. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). See generally 5 J. WIGMORE, supra
note 12, at §§ 1395-1400.
27. See, e.g., FED. R. EviD. 803(b) advisory committee's note; HOUSE COMM. ON THE JU-
DICIARY, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973);
MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 306.
28. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 306, at 872.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 810, at 879.
31. According to McCormick, the rule against hearsay was a late development of the
British common law. Id. § 244, at 726. Nonetheless, the last sixty years in the United
States has been a time of evidence law codification. The Commonwealth Fund Act, see
E.M. MORGAN, Z. CHAFEE, JR., R.W. GIFFORD, E.W. HINTON, C.M. HOUGH, W.A. JOHN-
STON, E.R. SUNDERLAND & J.H. HIGMORE, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, SOME PROPOSALS FOR
ITS REFORM 63 (1927); the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, 9A U.L.A. 506
(1965); and the 1953 Uniform Rules of Evidence, 9A U.L.A. 637 (1965), liberalized the
foundation requirements for qualifying a document as a business record; cf. J. WEINSTEIN,
J. MANSFIELD, N. ABRAMS & M. BERGER, EVIDENCE CASES AND MATERIALS 779-81 (7th ed.
1982). The Commonwealth Fund Act was adopted by Congress as the Act of June 20,
1936, 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1964), and repealed in part upon adoption of the Federal Rules of
[Vol. VII
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mon-law foundation for qualifying a document as a business record has
included testimonial proof of four elements: (1) The record is an origi-
nal entry made in the routine course of business; (2) the entries were
made upon the personal knowledge of the recorder or someone report-
ing to him; (3) the entries were made at or near the time of the transac-
tion; and (4) the recorder and his informant are unavailable. 32 When
these conditions are met, courts are willing to forgo the requirements
attendant to live testimony.
In recent years, however, courts have relaxed these substitute con-
ditions of circumstantial trustworthiness for business records in defer-
ence to the exigencies of modern business practices and the desire for
an efficient trial process.33 For example, the size and complexity of eco-
nomic and political institutions has attenuated the requirement that
each and -every employee representing a link in the chain from transac-
tion to offered evidence appear and testify unless unavailable. 34 Even if
all the employees are available, it makes sense to avoid parading them
to the witness stand in order to minimize the expense and disruption to
the institution as well as the lengthy process of so qualifying every busi-
ness record.
Should computer records be treated differently from manually or
mechanically maintained business records? Before computerization had
become so widespread, a number of influential writers expressed con-
cern over the interaction between computerization and traditional evi-
dence doctrine. The following excerpt from an article by Judge Brown
captures the dilemma:
For a machine now capable of making 240,000 additions per second,
reading magnetic tape containing four million digits of information on
a single reel at a breath-taking speed, to speak of the shop book rule is,
Evidence in 1975. (Section (b) of the Commonwealth Fund Act remains as § 1732, a best-
evidence alternative to Rule 1003.) The Uniform Act was adopted by numerous states,
listed in 9A U.L.A. 506 (1965). Texas adopted a hybrid of the Commonwealth and Uni-
form Acts. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon 1968). For a legislative his-
tory of the changes in the Federal Rules version of the business records exception,
compare FED. R. EVID. 803(b) advisory committee's note with CONF. COMM., FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE, H.R. REP. No. 1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1974) [hereinafter H.R.
REP. No. 1597]; SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, S. REP.
No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1974); HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL RULES
OF EVIDENCE, H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1973) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No.
650].
For an alternative statute that addresses the computerized evidence problem in great
detail, see The South Australia Evidence Act Part VI A, § 59a-59c, as amended through
1975, reproduced in COMPUTER LAW SERVICE, at app. 5-4.1a (R. Bigelow ed. 1977).
32. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 306 n.2 (citing Laughlin, Business Entries and the
Like, 46 IOWA L. REV. 276, 282 (1961)).
33. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee's note.
34. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 311, at 880.
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indeed, an anachronism. But we operate more comfortably with famil-
iar concepts. Just as that rule dispensed with the necessity of produc-
ing the person who made the entry, the law must find a means of
giving judicial currency to that which is reliable and acceptable in the
market place.
35
Judge Brown juxtaposes doctrinal anachronism and practical neces-
sity. On the one hand, the business records exception does not seem to
fit the complexity of electronic recordkeeping. On the other hand, doc-
trine that calls for evidence of circumstantial trustworthiness ought to
take into account everyday business reliance upon such records.36 The
danger attendant to applying familiar legal concepts like the shop-book
rule to new situations is that traditional concepts might predispose
judges to treat new situations as if they were not new at all. Important
differences would elude consideration. While most writers have con-
cerned themselves only with guiding beginning practitioners safely
through the most stringent foundation requirements, 37 a few have ques-
tioned the wisdom of applying traditional evidence doctrine to new re-
cordkeeping technology.38
In an article well known among those concerned with computer-ev-
35. Brown, Electronic Brains and the Legal Mind. Computing the Data Computer's
Collision with Law, 71 YALE L.J. 239, 248 (1961). Judge John R. Brown was the Chief
Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.
36. See also 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, at § 1530.
37. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 314, states, quite accurately, that the only real
uncertainty regarding admissibility of computer records is the scope of the foundation re-
quired. For an excellent introduction to the area, see Tapper, Evidence from Computers,
8 GA. L. REV. 562 (1974). Perhaps the best of the practitioner-education articles are Freed,
Computer Printouts as Evidence, in 16 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 273 (1965) (outlining the
questions and testimony to be elicited); Freed, Fenwick & McGoniga, Mock Trial: Admis-
sibility of the Computerized Business Records Problem, 15 JURIMETRICS J. 206 (1975); Rob-
erts, A Practitioner's Primer on Computer-Generated Evidence, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 254
(1974) (while offering an excellent introduction for litigators, Roberts worries about both
too easy and too difficult admissibility, with little analysis); see also Computer-Related Evi-
dence Law, 1 COMPUTER L.J. 667 (1979). For a selective bibliography, see USE OF COM-
PUTERS IN LITIGATION 379-80 (J.H. Young, M.E. Kris & H.C. Trainor eds. 1979).
38. Compare Freed, supra note 37, at 276 & 102, 109 (Supp. 1984) (outlining additional
testimony needed for admission of accounting record print-outs) with Freed, A Lawyer's
Guide Through the Computer Maze, 6 PRAC. LAW. 15, 28 (1960) (computer bookkeeping or
computation reliability should be treated no differently than manual procedures); see also
Singer, Proposed Changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence as Applied to Computer-Gener-
ated Evidence, 7 RUTGERS J. COMPUTERS TECH. & L. 157, 159 (1979) (calling for a new rule
to accommodate new technology). It is my position that, although a more comprehensive
foundation is called for, new rules are neither likely nor needed. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 112-24 & 167-202 for a discussion of rationales for reading the current rules as
requiring a more comprehensive foundation.
Two excellent articles describe the differences between computerized records and
traditional business records in detail, but do not deal in any depth with legal doctrine in
general or the Federal Rules of Evidence in particular. See Dehetre, Data Processing Evi-
[Vol. VII
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idence problems, Colin Tapper compared common-law and statutory ev-
idence principles with statutes drafted to deal specifically with evidence
generated by computers. 39 While observing that computer recordkeep-
ing differs significantly from conventional practices, 40 Tapper suggests
that special legislation is undesirable.41 His rationale reflects Judge
Brown's observation regarding our preference for familiar concepts, as
well as his own confidence in judicial development of proper legal doc-
trine. 42 Nonetheless, Tapper's brief evaluation of the (then still pro-
posed) Rules calls into question the business record exception's
applicability to printouts:43 it "would involve an expansive reading of
the term 'data compilation' to encompass the entire process of computer
system from the reception of data, through the key-punching, encoding
and computer calculation, to the final printing-out of the
information.
'44
In contrast to Tapper's apprehension that the business records ex-
ception under the Rules could be read to exclude printouts of computer-
ized business records, current writers harbor no such fears.4 5 While
noting the special character of computer recordkeeping, McCormick
states that courts have dealt competently with the admissibility of com-
puter-generated evidence under the Rules.46 Indeed, Tapper himself
notes that, in principle, the foundation for computer records "would not
seem to differ from the foundation required for . . . conventional busi-
ness records. '47 Still, Tapper feels compelled to caution courts about
dence-Is It Different?, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 567 (1976); Sprowl, Evaluating the Credibil-
ity of Computer-Generated Evidence, 52 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 547 (1976).
The clearest exception to the typical commentary is Singer's article, which offers an
amendment to accommodate evidence from computers. The Singer amendment should be
compared with the South Australia Evidence Act, supra note 31.
39. Tapper, supra note 37, at 562.
40. Id. at 565. Tapper notes that computer recordkeeping differs significantly from
conventional practices not only because many intermediate steps are bypassed, but also
because of decreasing contact between human beings and the information needed to con-
duct a business. Id.
41. Id. at 613.
42. See id. Perhaps Professor Tapper's education and teaching experience in the Brit-
ish common-law tradition illuminates his confidence in the judiciary.
43. Id. at 603-04. The wording of Rule 803(6) vacillates between "regularly kept" and
"business" records. For a legislative history of that movement, see sources cited supra
note 31.
44. Tapper, supra note 37, at 604. Tapper does not question the prudence of the par-
ticular rules, although he prefers general statutes like the Federal Rules of Evidence. In-
stead, he focuses on the proponent's task of successfully qualifying computerized data as
business records.
45. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 314, at 885; Johnston, A Guide for the Pro-
ponent and Opponent of Computer-Based Evidence, 1 COMPUTER L.J. 667 (1979);
46. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 314, at 886.
47. Tapper, supra note 37, at 595.
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"the complex nature of computers and lay unfamiliarity with their
processes. '48
Although commentators disagree over the proper response,49 it is
important to note that they all agree that computer data raise new
questions regarding reliability within the traditional bounds of the busi-
ness records exception.
III. Federal Courts and the Business Records Exception
This section first analyzes court treatment of computer data under
the traditional shop-book rule, then explicates court interpretation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence, and finally presents the approach rec-
ommended in the Manual for Complex Litigation for dealing with tech-
nologically produced hearsay evidence-computerized business records.
A. THE TRADITIONAL SHOP-BOOK RULE: A DOCTRINAL SPLIT
Federal court treatment of computerized business records prior to
the enactment of the Rules in 1975 substantiates the commentators' di-
lemma. Two opposing lines of opinion regarding proper qualification of
computerized business records emerged under the Federal Business
Records Act. 50 One line of opinion simply pointed to the practical ne-
cessity for computerized business records as the rationale for adopting
the traditional foundation for the business records exception: if com-
puterized records are good enough for businesses, they are good enough
for the courts.51 Any absence of testimony regarding accuracy of of-
fered printouts of business records could be shown to affect their
weight, but not their admissibility. 52 Indeed, one court stated that
printouts "produced in the ordinary course of business ... at least have
48. Id. For a typical range of writing on the subject, see, e.g., Roberts, supra note 37
(declaring that difficulties with qualification of computerized records are part of a litiga-
tor's responsibility); Singer, supra note 38 (proposing that the legislature amend Rule 901
to deal explicitly with computerized records); Essay, A Reconsideration of the Admissibil-
ity of Computer-Generated Evidence, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 425 (1977) (suggesting that
federal courts require showing that data processing systems have satisfactory controls).
To the extent that any special treatment is permitted, courts might allow the ob-
jecting party to attack the computerized document's probative value. See infra text ac-
companying notes 73-83.
49. See supra note 38 and references cited therein.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1732(a) (1970) (repealed in part in 1984).
51. See, e.g., United States v. DeGeorgia, 420 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969); Louisville & N.
R.R. v. Knox Homes Corp., 343 F.2d 887 (5th Cir. 1965) (Brown, J.).
52. See, e.g., D & H Auto Parts v. Ford Mktg. Corp., 57 F.R.D. 548, 551 (E.D.N.Y.
1973). One commentator first concedes admissibility and then exhorts opponents to con-
tinue the fight by attacking probative value. See Bender, Computer Evidence Law: Scope
and Structure, 1 COMPUTER L.J. 699, 707-09 (1979).
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a prima facie aura of reliability. '53
The contrasting line of opinion did not presume that electronic data
processing is reliable. It imposed an additional burden on those who
had computerized their regular recordkeeping and wished to offer their
records as evidence. Perhaps the most frequently cited example of a
careful foundation appears in United States v. Russo.54 The trial court
in Russo had heard detailed and extensive testimony from expert wit-
nesses familiar with the particular computer system that produced the
printout offered as evidence. Those witnesses gave testimony regarding
(1) the mechanics of data input control designed to ensure accuracy; (2)
the nature of the information constituting the input; and (3) the busi-
ness' reliance on the printout in the ordinary course of its activities.55
In addition to affirming the trial court's standard for qualifying the
printout, the appellate court held that the underlying data, computer
programs, and other relevant discovery documents had to be made
available to the opposing party far in advance of trial.5 6 Yet the court
did not require affirmative proof of computer system reliability, even
though the opinion cited with approval the two leading state court opin-
ions that call for such proof.5 7
Still, Russo stands for the proposition that computerized business
records merit special qualification requirements. The concurring opin-
ion in a case four years earlier, United States v. DeGeorgia,58 went even
further in imposing an additional burden on the proponent of such evi-
dence. Judge Ely wrote that qualifying a computer printout under the
business records exception should not shift the burden of demonstrating
the accuracy of computer records to the opponent.59 The business rec-
ord's proponent must make a prima facie case of computer system relia-
bility. Judge Ely's position is in sharp contrast to the majority's holding
53. Olympic Ins. Co. v. H.D. Harrison, Inc., 418 F.2d 669, 670 (5th Cir. 1969); see also
Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 115 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987
(1976).
54. 480 F.2d 1228 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1157 (1974) (admitting annual
statistical run of insurance company, which was offered to show that allegedly stolen ve-
hicle was not rented while in defendant's possession).
55. Russo, 480 F.2d at 1240-41.
56. Id. at 1242 (citing MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRIcT LITIGATION § 2.716,
at 88 (predecessor to MANUAL, supra note 14)). The lower court's standard for qualifying
the printout of the annual statistical run did not include an inquiry into the system hard-
ware's reliability. Because there was no evidence taken on that point, the appellate court
apparently was satisfied to assume such reliability. Id. at 1240-41.
57. The opinion cited King v. State ex rel. Murdock Acceptance Corp., 222 So. 2d 393
(Miss. 1969), and Transportation Indem. Co. v. Seib, 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965).
Both opinions are cited in the Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 901(b)(9). See infra
notes 125-62 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Note and the Rule.
58. 420 F.2d 889 (9th Cir. 1969).
59. Id. at 895-96.
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that company reliance on computerized business records represents an
adequate foundation for admissibility.60 His opinion differed from the
majority's opinion over the inference of reliability from the fact of reli-
ance. It also differed over the merger of circumstantial trustworthiness
and systemic reliability. Such disagreement over the proper relation-
ship between the ideas of trustworthiness and reliability has diminished
in significance under the business records exception of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.
B. THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE: PROCEEDINGS JUSTLY
DETERMINED
Current treatment of computerized business records under Rule
803(6) plots a course parallel to the liberal-admissibility line of earlier
cases. Courts today demand no special foundation for qualifying com-
puter printouts and their underlying data as business records.61 Does
that course follow from a reading of the Rule? At first blush, it does
appear to follow. The rule states in relevant part that
[t]he following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the
declarant is available as a witness: ... (6) Records of Regularly Con-
ducted Activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data compilation,
in any form.... if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business
activity . . . unless the source of information or method or circum-
stances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness.6 2
Two points are certain: First, "data compilation" includes informa-
tion maintained in computer databases, 63 and second, the hearsay rule
does not exclude data compilations, in any form, kept in the ordinary
course of business.64 Tapper's uneasiness about the scope of "data com-
pilation" aside,65 Rule 803(6) does propound an explicit "unless" caveat
that calls upon courts to take into account lack of trustworthiness. This
60. Id. at 893 n.11 (immaterial that records were kept on computer).
61. But see Capital Marine Supply, Inc. v. M/V Roland Thomas, II, 719 F.2d 104 (5th
Cir. 1983). Capital Marine Supply seems to be an exception because the opinion describes
rather extensive authentication testimony, including daily verification of information
against daily manual ledger cards and collection registers. Id. at 105-06. The court, how-
ever, judged the testimony against a general foundation standard that took into account
neither the special problems of computer system reliability nor the traditional doctrine of
authentication. Id. at 106. For further discussion of the Fifth Circuit's position, see infra
text accompanying notes 75-83. For a discussion of the general foundation for qualifying
business records, see supra notes 25-34 and accompanying text.
62. FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (emphasis added).
63. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory committee's note.
64. The definition of "business" is broad. Compare FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory com-
mittee's note with H.R. No. 1597, supra note 31, at 3.
65. See supra notes 39-44 and accompanying text; see also MCCORMICK, supra note 12,
at § 314 n.6 (expressing similar uneasiness).
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section demonstrates that courts need not and, further, should not qual-
ify computerized business records as if they were no different from
other business records, and that the Rule's caveat instructs judges to in-
quire into a computerized recordkeeping system's trustworthiness. 66
Part 1 sets the foundation question and the caveat's instruction within
the overall structure of the Rules. Part 2 then reviews current court
treatment of computerized business records and criticizes it as both
mechanical and outside the Rules' purport.
1. Rule 803(6)'s Caveat and the Trial Court's Responsibility.-Rule
803(6) does not require a judge to exclude a data compilation qualified
as a business record unless lack of trustworthiness is indicated. A busi-
ness record, of course, is not automatically admitted upon qualification.
It must, for example, meet relevancy, best-evidence, and other require-
ments.67 Once untrustworthiness is indicated, however, the judge must
exclude the offered business record. 68 But how is it that the source of
information or the method or circumstances of preparation are deemed
untrustworthy? Is it part of the proponent's burden of qualification?
Or does the opponent have a burden of coming forward with evidence,
or even a burden of persuading the judge?
The issue of (un)trustworthiness falls under the Rule 104(a) head-
ing of preliminary questions of fact.69 While the Rules are silent about
allocating burdens of proving these questions, there does seem to be a
settled practice:70 When a judge hears evidence to determine prelimi-
nary questions of fact, the proponent generally has the burden of estab-
lishing those facts by a preponderance of the evidence. 71 The opponent
has the burden of producing evidence to show the existence of grounds
for objection.7 2
Does Rule 803(6)'s caveat require that the proponent offer evidence
of trustworthiness? Or does it fall outside the general rule regarding
the burden of proof for preliminary facts? Is it the opponent who must
66. For an analysis demonstrating that Rule 901(b)(9) provides the appropriate stan-
dard for admission of computerized records, see inkfra text accompanying notes 125-62.
67. For a discussion concerning the relevance of the distinction between "not ex-
cluded" and "admitted" to the authentication problem, see infra notes 108-11 & 152-54
and accompanying text.
68. See FED. R. EVID. 104, 803(6), 1101(d)(1) advisory committee's note.
69. FED. R. EvID. 104(a).
70. FED. R. EVID. 104 advisory committee's note; see MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at
§ 53; P.F. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 20-22 (student ed. 1979).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980 (6th Cir. 1978); C.A. WRIGHT &
K.W. GRAHAM, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5053 (1984) [hereinafter WRIGHT &
GRAHAM]. For a discussion regarding the current court practice, see infra notes 73-83 and
accompanying text.
72. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 53; WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 71, at § 5053.
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produce evidence of untrustworthiness as grounds for objection? The
procedure is in doubt because the language of the Rule seems to conflict
with the general practice of requiring the proponent to prove prelimi-
nary questions of fact: the caveat calls for exclusion of a business rec-
ord upon some indication of lack of trustworthiness--certainly a bizarre
burden for a proponent. Nonetheless, the phraseology still allows for
two conflicting interpretations. On the one hand, it might make sense
to hold that unless the proponent produces evidence indicating trust-
worthiness, a presumption of lack of trustworthiness prevails. This in-
terpretation is consistent with the hearsay rule's general presumption
of untrustworthiness and with the general practice of placing the bur-
den on the proponent. On the other hand, it also seems reasonable that
unless the opponent produces evidence tending to show a lack of trust-
worthiness, the record qualifies. This view accords with the presumed
trustworthiness of writings once qualified as business records and with
the caveat's instruction to exclude an otherwise-qualified business rec-
ord on some indication of "lack of trustworthiness." Both interpreta-
tions of Rule 803(6) and its caveat regarding trustworthiness seem to
make good sense.
2. The Courts: Splitting the Difference.-Which presumption
takes precedence and which party must carry the burden of proving the
preliminary question of fact regarding (lack of) trustworthiness? This
quandry replays the dilemma between trustworthiness and reliability
suggested in the excerpt from Judge Brown's early article and in the
pre-Rules case law.
73
This section quickly reviews the current court practice of presum-
ing the trustworthiness of computer output that has been qualified as
business records, and the practice of permitting the opponent to attack
trustworthiness, if at all, only with regard to probative value-that is,
only after the printout already has been admitted into evidence. This
section concludes that while the courts' presumption of trustworthiness
is plausible, it ultimately is undesirable, because such treatment of the
burden-of-proof issue is unfair to the objecting party.74
An extreme example of the presumption of trustworthiness of com-
puterized records is a recent Fifth Circuit opinion, United States v.
Vela,75 which involved the government's use of telephone company bills
to prove its case. The district court admitted copies of microfiche
records of telephone company bills revealing aspects of Vela's telephone
usage. Typically, computer systems record the initial dialing of calls,
73. See supra notes 35-38 & 50-60 and accompanying text.
74. For an interpretivist argument based on a close reading of the Rules, see infra
notes 101-75 and accompanying text.
75. 673 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982).
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compute charges, and prepare bills. The government offered no testi-
mony regarding the telephone company's computer system other than
statements about the general reliability of the process, perhaps as a con-
sequence of the district court judge's great faith in electronic data
processing systems and his lesser regard for their human overseers.
The judge considered computerized records even more reliable than the
"average business records" because they were "not even touched by the
hand of man."
'76
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the lower court decision as being within
the trial judge's discretion. In the course of its opinion, the appellate
panel observed that the federal courts were (and still are) split on the
question of admissibility of computerized business records,7 7 but chose
to maintain its prior position, articulated in Rosenberg v. Collins,7 3 that
computer data should be treated like any other record of a regularly
conducted activity. The court acknowledged and rejected the Eighth
Circuit's view, announced in United States v. Scholle,79 that a unique
foundation is necessary for computerized business records.
Although the Scholle opinion does refer to a need for special quali-
fication, the split between the circuits turns out to be more rhetorical
than substantial. First, the court in Scholle was willing to assume that
properly functioning computer equipment was used.8 0 Second, its ap-
parent demand for a more comprehensive foundation should not be con-
fused with the pre-Rules opinions that required a higher standard for
admissibility. The court in Scholle considered any evidentiary short-
coming in developing the foundation for admission of printouts from a
computer retrieval system to go to the weight to be given the evidence
rather than to its admissibility.8 1
The breadth of agreement between the circuits is much wider than
the split. First, both circuits agree, despite Rule 104(a), that the ques-
tion of trustworthiness should not be treated as a preliminary question
76. Vela, 673 F.2d at 90.
77. Id. at 88.
78. 624 F.2d 659, 665 (5th Cir. 1980). Although a more recent opinion, Capital Marine
Supply, Inc. v. M/V Roland Thomas II, 719 F.2d 104 (5th Cir. 1983), affirmed a lower
court's qualification of computerized business records on a more comprehensive founda-
tion, it redefined the Rosenberg standard.
Rosenberg is also cited by State Office Sys., Inc. v. Olievetti Corp., 762 F.2d 843, 845
(10th Cir. 1985); United States v. Croft, 750 F.2d 1354, 1364 (7th Cir. 1984); and Pacific
Serv. Stations Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 689 F.2d 1055, 1061 (Temp. Emer. Ct. App. 1982). All
three opinions refer to Rosenberg as authority for the proposition that computerized
records are treated under Rule 803(6) just like manually kept records and that admissibil-
ity is ultimately within the trial court's discretion.
79. 553 F.2d 1109, 1125 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 940 (1977).
80. Scholle, 553 F.2d at 1125.
81. Id.
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of fact to be determined by the judge,8 2 but instead should be treated as
a component of probative value to be weighed by the jury. Second, they
agree that for purposes of Rule 803(6), computer printouts qualify on
the same basis as any other business record.8 3
The area of disagreement, if any, has shifted to the domain of pro-
bative value. Given the broad power of federal judges to comment on
the evidence, a proponent in the Eighth Circuit who offers no more
than the standard business record foundation takes the risk that a judge
might comment unfavorably to a jury. In a nonjury trial, the risk
changes, since a judge might discount substantially the probative value
of a computerized business record. Still, the computer printout's ap-
pearance and its aura of reliability remain a powerful counterweight for
the proponent; potential sources of error are not immediately apparent
to a trier of fact or to an objecting party. Further, with no burden of
proving reliability, the offering party need not present any witness to
cross-examine or any evidence to rebut. Finally, the objecting party
often faces great difficulty and expense in discovery and in hiring ex-
perts to investigate the system's reliability. The balance tips even more
to the proponent's favor in the common context of an individual defend-
ant's confronting a large firm or government agency-or both, as in the
Vela prosecution.
The shift of the disagreement between the circuits to the domain of
probative value can be described as a pragmatic movement to resolve
the dilemma raised by the doctrinal confrontation of necessity and relia-
bility-as a reconciliation between the two pre-Rules lines of cases that
reflect that dilemma. In particular, the need for computerized business
records is served by their easy admissibility, while the issue of system
reliability can be joined before the jury under the rubric of probative
value. Certainly the trial process calls for pragmatic solutions. Has this
one worked?
First, the courts' mechanical application of the business records ex-
ception to computer data shifts the burden of raising and proving sys-
temic unreliability to the opponent, despite the proponent's superior
ability to offer evidence. Second, the issue of reliability (that is, lack of
trustworthiness) does not affect admissibility, but only probative value,
although Rule 803(6)'s caveat suggests that it should. Although the
weight of the evidence is certainly a significant concern, the objecting
82. The trial judge has discretion in letting the jury hear evidence on preliminary
questions of fact. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 53; see FED. R. EvID. 104(c) &
advisory committee's note.
83. For a comparison of different approaches to qualifying computer printouts spe-
cially prepared for trial, see the majority and dissenting opinions in Perma Research &
Dev. v. Singer, 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976). Courts turn to FED.
R. EVID. 901(b)(9) only for special reports or analysis underlying expert testimony.
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party faces an extremely difficult and expensive task, especially in light
of judges' views of computer systems as particularly reliable, their
broad discretion in evidentiary matters, and the proponent's disincen-
tive to call witnesses open to cross-examination and to offer evidence
susceptible to rebuttal. A comparison of practices sanctioned by the
courts and those recommended in the authoritative Manual for Com-
plex Litigation (Manual) corroborates the view that current court in-
terpretation of the Rules has generated unfair process and undesirable
consequences.
C. Manual for Complex Litigation: An Alternative Practice
Produced under the auspices of the statutorily created Federal Ju-
dicial Center, the Manual offers analysis and recommendations to fos-
ter "fair, firm, and efficient judicial control of litigation."8 4 Although
originally intended for multidistrict litigation, the Manual suggests pro-
cedures to accomplish the "speedy" and "just disposition" of complex
litigation.8
5
In a section entitled "Proof of Facts in Complex Cases," the Man-
ual makes six recommendations to bridge the growing "gap between
the competence of the juror, the bench, and the bar, on the one hand,
and the competence of the persons and machines employed by business
and science to ascertain facts and draw conclusions, on the other. '86
84. MANUAL, supra note 14, at iv.
85. Id. at vii.
86. Id. § 2.71, at 110; see also id. § 3.50 (similar recommendation regarding admission
of computer runs for later point in the pretrial process).
The Manual's six recommendations are as follows:
2.711 First Recommendation. Voluminous or complicated data of an admissi-
ble character should, whenever possible, be presented through written or oral
summaries, tabulations, charts, graphs, or extracts. The underlying data, to-
gether with the proposed exhibits or summary testimony, should be made avail-
able to opposing counsel well in advance of the time they are to be offered, to
permit all objections to be raised and if possible resolved prior to the offer. Un-
derlying data should be placed in evidence in the ordinary case.
2.712 Second Recommendation. Scientifically designed samples and polls,
meeting the tests of necessity and trustworthiness, are useful adjuncts to conven-
tional methods of proof and may contribute materially to shortening the trial of
the complex case.
2.713 Third Recommendation. The underlying data, method of interpretation
employed, and conclusions reached in polls and samples should be made available
to the opposing party far in advance of trial, and, if possible, prior to the taking of
the poll or sample.
2.714 Fourth Recommendation. When computer-maintained records and
computer analyses of raw data are valuable sources of evidence, their use and ad-
missibility should be promoted and facilitated. Computer inputs and outputs, the
underlying data, and the program method employed should be made available to
the opposing party in advance of trial as a condition of admissibility.
2.715 Fifth Recommendation. Discovery requests relating to the computer
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The fundamental concerns motivating these recommendations are fair-
ness to the party opposing computerized evidence and encouragement
of the introduction of admissible computer evidence.8 7
The Manual's interpretation of Rule 803(6) follows its sixth
recommendation:
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6), the business records exception to the
hearsay rule, treats computer data on the same basis as other business
records. However, the Rule allows the court to consider the special
characteristics of computer records in determining whether to admit
them. This recommendation is therefore intended to provide specific
guidance for the court's application of Rule 803(6). s s
Thus, the Manual stakes out a middle ground between the current
court position that all business records should simply be qualified on
the same foundation and the Rule 104(a)-inspired position that the
judge must consider the special characteristics of computer records.8 9
The Manual's recommendation is offered to guide the court in the
proper exercise of its discretionary power to determine
trustworthiness.
and its programs, inputs, and outputs should be processed using methods consis-
tent with the approach used in discovery of other types of information.
2.716 Sixth Recommendation. Computer-maintained records kept in the reg-
ular course of business and printouts prepared especially for litigation should be
admitted if the courts finds that reliable computer equipment and techniques
have been used and that the material is of probative value. The court should
therefore require, well in advance of trial, that (a) the offering party demonstrate
that the input procedures conform to the standard practice of persons engaged in
the business or profession of the party or person from whom the printout is ob-
tained; (b) in the case of a printout prepared especially for trial, the offering
party demonstrate that the person from whom the printout is obtained relied on
the data base in making a business or professional judgment within a reasonably
short period of time before producing the printout sought to be introduced; (c)
the offering party provide expert testimony that the processing program reliably
and accurately processes the data in the data base; and (d) the opposing party be
given the opportunity to depose the offeror's witness and to engage a witness of
its own to evaluate the processing procedure.
Id. §§ 2.711-.716.
The Manual, Second discussed the issues addressed by the six recommendations and
the pertinent commentary in two paragraphs and two textual notes. MANUAL, SECOND,
supra note 15, § 21.446, at 60-62 & nn. 80-81; see infra notes 88 & 90.
87. See, e.g., MANUAL, supra note 14, at § 2.714.
88. Id. § 2.716, at 122 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); see MANUAL, SECOND,
supra note 15, § 21.446, at 61 n.80. Immediately following footnote 80's reference to Rule
803(6) and discussion of the business record exception's application to computer data, foot-
note 81 makes an explicit reference to Rule 901(b)(9) and the authentication requirement.
Id. at 61 n.81. See infra notes 112-24 and accompanying text for discussion of the authen-
tication requirement.
89. It is not surprising that the Manual describes the judge's power as discretionary
because, after all, its authors are judges. Still, the Manual's middle position makes better
sense than the court's inattention to the distinctions between computerized business
records and traditional leatherbound shop books.
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What does the Manual envision as the proper practice of establish-
ing the trustworthiness of a computerized business record? It proposes
a four-step process.90 The proponent should offer proof that (1) the
document is a business record;9 ' (2) the document has probative value;
(3) the computer equipment used is reliable; and (4) reliable data
processing techniques were applied. Clearly, this recommendation is at
odds with the decisions of the Fifth and the Eighth Circuits. The Fifth
Circuit requires no proof of the third and fourth criteria,9 2 while the
Eighth Circuit's demand for comprehensive proof has no teeth-a pro-
ponent's failure to comply with its demand is not adequate grounds for
reversing the trial court's acceptance of the records.93
In addition to recommending a more comprehensive foundation,
the Manual encourages the judge to take a strong position regarding
pretrial discovery of computerized documents.9 4 The fourth recommen-
dation warns that "[c]omputer inputs and outputs, the underlying data,
and the program method employed should be made available to the op-
posing party in advance of trial as a condition of admissibility. s9 5 Fur-
ther, the offering party should provide expert testimony that the
processing programs reliably and accurately process the information in
the business record database.96 To emphasize that it remains the propo-
nent's task to qualify computerized business records, the Manual main-
tains that "no procedure should be adopted if it would in effect place
the burden of disproving admissibility on the opposing party. '97
The Manual's purpose is to guide judges in requiring proponents to
offer evidence of computer system reliability. In sharp contrast to the
courts' interpretation of Rule 803(6) as calling for an inference of relia-
bility from day-to-day business reliance, the Manual considers inade-
quate the circumstantial trustworthiness derived from computer data's
status as business records. Moreover, the Manual's mandate for open
discovery of computer-related documents does not imply a shift of the
proponent's burden of proof; rather, it provides the objecting party with
further assurance of a fair opportunity to rebut the comprehensive
90. MANUAL, supra note 14, at § 2.716; see infra note 99. The four-step process com-
bines the business-records and authentication requirements.
91. For a description of this step, see supra text accompanying note 32.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 75-83.
93. See supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text. The Manual mistakenly cites
Scholle as authority for a more stringent standard of qualification. See MANUAL, supra
note 14, § 2.716, at 121 n.302.
94. MANUAL, supra note 14, at § 2.71 (first, third, fourth, fifth, and sixth recommen-
dations); see MANUAL, SECOND, supra note 15, § 21.446, at 59.
95. MANUAL, supra note 14, § 2.714, at 117 (emphasis added).
96. Id. § 2.716, at 121 (sixth recommendation, part (c)).
97. Id. § 2.713, at 117 (commentary after third recommendation).
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foundation required of the proponent. 98
IV. Two Arguments for Adopting the MANUAL'S PRACTICE IN ALL
CASES
The courts' current interpretation of Rule 803(6) is open to serious
question, not only because of the unfair burden it imposes on opposing
parties, but also because it is less plausible than an alternative reading
of the Rule that supports the Manual's recommendations.99 The alter-
native reading's connection between Rule 803(b) and Rule 901(b)(9)
makes good sense because treating the Rule 803(6) caveat about trust-
worthiness as a preliminary question of fact both diminishes unfairness
to the objecting party and increases the quantity and quality of admit-
ted evidence. Accordingly, the better practice (that is, the one in tune
with our fundamental commitment to trial on the merits) requires the
proponent to offer evidence of the computer system's reliability in order
to qualify a computerized business record.
The next two sections develop two different rationales in support of
a more comprehensive foundation for computerized business records.
The first section examines the legislative history of the Rules and clari-
fies the relationship between the business records exception and the
Rules dealing with authentication of documentary evidence.1 00 The sec-
ond section investigates computer system reliability. Both sections con-
clude that requiring a comprehensive foundation, as suggested by the
Manual, makes sense-sense that is founded in statutory interpretation
and in the practical limitations of complex technology.
A. AN INTERPRETIVIST ARGUMENT: THE PROPER READING OF THE
RULES
1. An Alternative Reading of Rule 803(6).-The Rules separate
hearsay exceptions into two categories. Under Rule 804, certain out-of-
court statements are not excluded as hearsay if the declarant is unavail-
able as a witness.1 1 On the other hand, business records, public
records, and other out-of-court statements enumerated in Rule 803 are
not excluded as hearsay, regardless of the declarant's availability. 0 2
The generally accepted interpretation of this categorization holds that
98. Ideally, much of this can be handled prior to trial. See generally id. §§ 2.71-.716.
99. The Manual does not mention any sort of close reading of the Rules. This alter-
native reading already has been suggested in the earlier explication of Rule 803(6)'s "un-
less" caveat and its relationship to Rule 104(a) preliminary questions of fact. See supra
notes 62-72 and accompanying text.
100. See FED. R. EVID. 803(6), 901, 902; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 44.
101. FED. R. EVID. 804(b).
102. FED. R. EVID. 803.
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Rule 803 documents-business records, for example-are imbued with
so much circumstantial trustworthiness that cross-examination of the
declarant would be superfluous. Given the courts' unflinching reliance
upon business reliance on records, it is not surprising that they admit
relevant business records into evidence rather routinely.
The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 803 describes the tradi-
tional policy underlying admission of hearsay: "[U]nder appropriate cir-
cumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness sufficient to justify non-production of the declarant
in person at the trial, even though he may be available."10 3
Circumstances must guarantee a high degree of trustworthiness to
justify nonproduction of a declarant, given our trust in the institution of
cross-examination. Other legislative history supports the courts' view
that business records represent an "appropriate circumstance" that
meets that high standard of trustworthiness. The Advisory Committee
makes specific reference to the unusual reliability of business
records.' 0 4 Furthermore, the House Committee Report describes inser-
tion of the word "business" into the Rule 803(6) language of "regularly
conducted activity" as motivated by the Committee's desire to assure a
high standard of circumstantial trustworthiness. 05 In short, the equa-
tion of business records and circumstantial trustworthiness is corrobo-
rated by the legislative history.10 6
But another interpretation of the legislative history makes good
sense as well. Both the Rule and the commentary can also be read as
demanding strong evidence of reliability to justify nonproduction of the
declarant and thus to qualify a computerized business record, rather
than as categorically presuming circumstantial trustworthiness. We al-
ready have seen that the Rule's caveat about lack of trustworthiness
raises the issue of proving reliability.10 7 Moreover, the Advisory Com-
mittee's excerpted statement that "appropriate" circumstances "may"
103. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note. The first proposed Rule 8-03 pro-
vided as follows: "A statement is not excluded by the hearsay rule if its nature and the
special circumstances under which it was made offer assurances of accuracy not likely to
be enhanced by calling the declarant as witness, even though he is available." Proposed
Rules of Evidence for the United States District Courts and Magistrates, Rule 8-03, 46
F.R.D. 161, 345 (1969).
104. FED. R. EVID. 803(b) advisory committee's note.
105. H.R. No. 650, supra note 31, at 14. Did the Joint Committee's broad definition of
"business" essentially cancel the anticipated increase in trustworthiness? Cf. H.R. No.
1597, supra note 31, at 3. It appears that the net change, if any, is the House Report's
statement of concern and its possible effect on interpretation of the Rule.
106. For an interesting jurisprudential analysis of legislative intent as the problematic
control mechanism for interpretivism, see Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARv. L. REV. 781 (1983).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 62-72.
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justify nonproduction of the declarant raises the issue whether all busi-
ness records present equally appropriate circumstances.
Apparently, the Advisory Committee views the qualification pro-
cess as a flexible one. No hearsay is conclusively trustworthy; under ap-
propriate circumstances, any hearsay may be trustworthy. Yet the Rule
states explicitly that business records "are not" excluded as hearsay and
that any form of data compilations can constitute a business record.'0 8
Nonetheless, the degree of circumstantial trustworthiness must be great
enough to deny the trier of fact its litmus test of credibility-the chem-
istry between witness and opposing counsel that separates truth from
falsehood, certainty from surmise-whether or not the declarant is
available. Given the high degree of trustworthiness demanded, the flex-
ibility recommended, and the differences in familiarity and complexity
between leatherbound shop books and computerized data processing, se-
rious questions are raised regarding the appropriateness of presuming
circumstantial trustworthiness of computerized records. Perhaps the
Manual's recommendations concerning proof of computer system relia-
bility should apply in all cases, whether or not considered complex. Ex-
tending the Manual's recommended practice makes good sense, not
only because of the high standard of circumstantial trustworthiness
needed to measure up to a declarant's testimony about system reliabil-
ity and subsequent subjection to cross-examination, but also because
such circumstances, even if proved, are not intended as a mechanical
guarantee of qualification. Rather, the Advisory Committee states that
they "may" (or may not) be adequate to replace live testimony. This
reading of legislative intent, again in conjunction with the Rule's caveat
regarding lack of trustworthiness, calls upon the court to require proof
of computer system reliability. Furthermore, the trial court's responsi-
bility to make an independent judgment is consistent with the overarch-
ing philosophy of flexibility intended to guide interpretation of the
Rules' hearsay exceptions. Just as the Rules call upon the court to ad-
mit hearsay evidence that is trustworthy, though not within the con-
tours of an enumerated exception, 10 9 so too do they reject a mechanical
jurisprudence that would admit any evidence meeting the formal crite-
ria of an enumerated exception. 110
108. FED. R. EVID. 803 ("The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even
though the declarant is available as a witness: .. .(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted
Activity....").
109. FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
110. See United States v. American Cyanamid Co., 427 F. Supp. 859 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(holding that Rule 102 allows court to expand Rule 803(24) beyond exceptional cases);
FED. R. EvID. 102. The trend of relaxing requirements is intended to decrease the need
for producing witnesses, not to diminish the contours of an adequate foundation. FED. R.
EVID. 803(6) advisory committee's note. McCormick comments on "the failure to adjust
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The purpose of the foregoing analysis is not to prove in some rigor-
ous sense (even if that were possible) that this alternative reading of
Rule 803(6) is the only reasonable one, but rather to demonstrate that a
more comprehensive foundation requirement like the practice recom-
mended in the Manual is a permissible inference from the Rules and
their legislative history. On those grounds, the following sections de-
velop further support for this reading by reviving the doctrine of au-
thentication and by closely reading of Rules 901 and 902.
Notwithstanding the courts' current limitation of the technical doctrine
of authentication to computer-generated documents specially prepared
for trial, Rule 901(b)(9) and its legislative history offer convincing sup-
port for the Manual's more demanding interpretation of the propo-
nent's burden of qualifying computerized business records. 1 '
2. The Doctrine of Authentication.-The traditional purpose of
document authentication is to establish that the document is what it
purports to be, in order to prove a relationship between the document
and an individual--often the opponent to admission.112 One common
example of authentication is proving the relationship between a promis-
sory note and the debtor by authenticating the debtor's signature. An-
other example is establishing the relationship between a computer-
generated monthly summary of account activity and the customer sum-
marized. 113 Still another example is establishing the relationship be-
tween a state government's computer-generated listing of a taxpayer's
liability and the taxpayer.1 1 4 The relevancy of a writing to an issue
raised in litigation often will be logically dependent on the existence of
some such relationship.115 For example, if the signature on a promis-
sory note is forged, then the note is not authentic and, as a consequence,
not relevant to the issue of a promise to pay a sum certain. This atti-
the rules of admissibility more flexibly and realistically to these variations in the reliabil-
ity of hearsay." MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 245, at 728-29. For a discussion of the need
for flexibility, see Loevinger, Facts, Evidence and Legal Proof, 9 W. RES. L. REV. 154, 165
(1958) ("[Tjhere can be little utility in a class which is so broad as to include the prattling
of a child and the mouthings of a drunk, the encyclical of a pope, a learned treatise, an
encyclopedia article, a newspaper report, an unverified rumor from anonymous sources,
an affidavit by a responsible citizen, a street corner remark, the judgment of a court."),
cited in MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 245, at 729 n.22. On the subject of mechanical juris-
prudence, see Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809 (1935); Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605 (1908).
111. The MANUAL, supra note 14, makes no reference to Rule 901. But see MANUAL,
SECOND, supra note 15, § 21.446, at 61 n.81.
112. See MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 218, at 684-86.
113. See, e.g., Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Swarens, 447 S.W.2d 53 (Ky. 1969).
114. See, e.g., Ed Guth Realty, Inc. v. Gingold, 34 N.Y.2d 440, 315 N.E.2d 441, 358
N.Y.S.2d 367 (1974) (admitting state tax records under business records statute).
115. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 218, at 686; cf. FED. R. EVID. 401 (relevancy).
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tude of judicial agnosticism toward authorship has been justified as a
check on the perpetration of fraud.116
Most commentators, however, see the requirement of authentica-
tion as time-consuming, expensive, and ineffective.117 They offer two
reasons for asserting that authentication should not be required.118
First, the overwhelming majority of writings are genuine. Second, the
opponent to admission is in the best position to demonstrate that the
purported connection of a writing to her is attributable to fraud or mis-
take.119 Given these conditions, it is reasonable to require the opponent
to carry the burden of proving inauthenticity. But do these rationales
apply as well to computerized business records as they do to promissory
notes? First, most purported business records probably are business
records. But computer printouts and the information constituting busi-
ness records are chronologically, physically, and computationally distant
from one another. There is no genuine business record in the sense
that there is a genuine note or contract. Thus, the judge, jury, and
counsel face a different and unfamiliar task in assessing the authentic-
ity of a computer printout. Second, with computerized data, the oppo-
nent to admission is not in the best position to demonstrate very much
about the proponent's system, especially the production of inauthentic
documents. The traditional rationales for eliminating authentication do
not make good sense with unsigned and unscrivened documents such as
computer printouts of business records.
With respect to business records in general, McCormick states that
a witness whose testimony is offered as foundation for authentication
need testify only that "the offered writing is actually part of the records
of the business.' 20 But if the offered document is a computer printout,
McCormick takes an intermediate position: the proponent should be re-
quired to prove that the printout accurately reflects what is in the com-
puter.' 2 ' Although this intermediate position is a step in the right
direction because it recognizes the complexity and time lag inherent in
producing the printout,122 that very recognition belies this treatment.
In short, how can we presume that "what is in the computer" is itself
reliable? The procedure for getting the information into the computer
116. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 218, at 687. But see articles by Sprowl and Dehetre,
supra note 38 (limits of computer audits).
117. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 218, at 687, § 228, at 701 n.10 (citing Broun,
Authentication and Contents of Writings, 1969 LAW & SOC. ORDER 611; Strong, Liberaliz-
ing the Authentication of Private Writings, 52 CORNELL, L.Q. 284 (1967)).
118. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 228, at 701.
119. Strong, supra note 117, at 291.
120. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 214, at 688.
121. Id. § 314, at 885 n.6 (interpreting Rule 901(b)(9)).
122. For example, the printout may have been produced years after the original
transaction.
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in order to create a printout is open to the same sort of questions. In-
putting, processing, storing, shifting, copying, re-storing, and recalling
the original business record information 123 from, to, and among various
magnetic tape and disc media, and during numerous trips through the
central processing unit and main memory registers dramatically in-
crease the probability of error. If the risk of information change,
whether the result of fraud or the consequence of error, is great enough
during the production of a printout to merit authentication, then the
greater risks attendant to the complex and prolonged process of con-
structing "what is in the computer" call even more convincingly for doc-
ument authentication.
1 24
3. Court Interpretation of Rules 901 and 902.-Despite significant
questions regarding the reliability of any computer printout of business
record information, courts have trivialized the authentication require-
ment under Rule 901. Courts have required proponents only to offer
testimony that the offered printouts are business records, 125 unless the
printout reflects a compilation or analysis specially prepared for trial, in
which case the proponent is required to prove that the system or pro-
cess has produced an accurate result.126 The general consequence of
this distinction is that computer-generated (specialized) reports' 27 or
studies are more difficult to qualify than computer-stored business
records. 128
It is not clear, however, that the basic distinction between special
and habitual production of reports has much to say about reliability.
Although regularly kept records may be trustworthy because of the ha-
bitual nature of the recordkeeping and reliance, specially prepared re-
ports probably get special attention from those personnel considered
the most reliable and knowledgeable. 129 Further, as the Manual points
out, computer processing frequently is not an electronic version of
double-entry bookkeeping. Rather, many computer systems do not re-
123. The presumption is that the procedure for recording information before the in-
putting stage meets the formal criteria of the business records exception.
124. See MANUAL, supra note 14, at § 2.716.
125. See, e.g., United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982).
126. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 125 (2d Cir.) (Van
Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
127. Regarding the foundation for summaries, see FED. R. EVID. 1006.
128. Cf. Bronstein & Engleberg, A Preliminary Assessment of the Reception of Com-
puter Evidence: Report of the Computer Evidence Survey Project, 21 JURIMETRICS J. 329
(1981). But the information in all printouts is both computer-generated and -stored.
129. Opinion does differ over the question whether specialized reports are more (or
less) prone to error. Compare Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 125 (2d
Cir.) (Graafeiland, J., dissenting) (more likely), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976) with
MANUAL, supra note 14, at § 2.716 (4th ed. 1977) (less likely).
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quire an entry for each individual transaction in a chain of transactions.
They maintain only the current balance of an account, and they elimi-
nate any trace of the intermediate transactions that led to the current
balance. 130 Moreover, by increasing the quantity and changing the char-
acter of data, computerized processing raises special concerns regarding
care in collection and recordation not associated with the more limited
records traditionally kept by businesses.13 1 The most recent prior edi-
tion of the Manual articulated its skepticism even more forcefully:
while computerized business records might be less acceptable in particu-
lar ways than handwritten books of account, 132 computerization of sta-
tistical analysis, summarization, and other data manipulation can
enhance the probative value of the evidence, due to the computer's su-
perior ability to handle large quantities of data and to perform errorless
mathematical computations, once the programs are properly tested.'
33
The Manual's position is at odds with the courts' presumptive confi-
dence in business records and presumptive skepticism regarding special-
ized reports. Instead, the Manual counsels faith in programs that are
properly tested, whether the records produced are general or special
purpose.
Even if it is conceded that the Rules call for some distinction be-
tween special and habitual reports, the courts seem to be making the
wrong one. Rule 902 states that extrinsic evidence of authenticity as a
condition precedent to admissibility is not required only with respect to
ten enumerated categories of documents, including, for example, certi-
fied copies of public records and acknowledged documents like wills. 3 4
This itemization does not include computerized business records. 135
Nonetheless, courts seem to treat computerized records as if they were
self-authenticating documents. 136
Rule 901 deals with authentication as a condition precedent to ad-
missibility. Since business records are not self-authenticating under
130. MANUAL, supra note 14, at § 2.716.
131. Id.
132. Id. § 2.716 (4th ed. 1977).
133. Id. § 2.717. The change in the Manual's language between the third and fourth
editions may be a step toward the current court practice of liberal admissibility of comput-
erized business records. On the other hand, it simply may reflect experience with the un-
even quality of data analysis done specially for trial.
134. FED. R. EVID. 902(4), 902(8); cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 44.
135. FED. R. EVID. 902 states that "[e]xtrinsic evidence of authenticity as a condition
precedent to admissibility is not required with respect to the following .... " An itemized
list of ten categories follows. See id. The argument of exclusivity is based on the hoary
interpretational canon of expressio unius and seems to make sense here.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982). McCormick states that
authentication "merely duplicates Rule 803(6)." MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 314, at 885
n.6.
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Rule 902, a proponent of business records should be required to produce
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the records are what the
proponent claims.1 37 In other words, a prima facie case must be made
that the offered document reflects business record information accu-
rately entered, stored, processed, and retrieved from the proponent's
computer system. Rule 901 presents ten examples to illustrate its au-
thentication requirement. One of the examples of authentication is
"[e]vidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and
showing that the process or system produces an accurate result. '1 3 8 It is
this illustration, under Rule 901(b)(9), that the courts apply to printouts
which represent the results of opinion polls,1 3 9 models and simulations,
and other types of special reports. 140
In contrast to this treatment of special reports, courts require the
proponent of computerized business records simply to identify the
printout as (a copy of) business records.1 4 1 This practice, if not viewed
as a questionable extension of Rule 902 and self-authentication, might
be described as authentication under either the Rule 901(b)(1) example
of testimony of a witness with knowledge or the Rule 901(b)(9) exam-
ple, whose commentary states that a court may take judicial notice of
the accuracy of a system or process.142 Both approaches to authenticat-
ing computerized business records are founded in questionable readings
of Rule 901, which provide only a weak basis for the courts' current
shorthand treatment of authentication.
First, the kind of testimony contemplated under Rule 901(b)(1)
makes no sense with regard to computer system functions, because a
human being can offer, at best, only circumstantial evidence of a com-
puter's proper processing of any piece of information. This example an-
ticipates eyewitness testimony of, for example, a document signing or
137. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
138. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9).
139. See, e.g., Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 680-86 (S.D.N.Y.
1963).
140. The doctrine of authentication applies regardless whether the process or system
involves computerization. See also FED. R. EVID. 703 (proper basis for expert testimony);
Cf. MANUAL, supra note 14, at §§ 2.711-716.
141. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 314, at 885 & n.6. This is a mistaken conflation of
the authentication and best-evidence requirements. See also ROTHSTEIN, supra note 70, at
450 (Aug. 1983 release). Rothstein directs the student from his Rule 901(b)(9) Practice
Comment (authentication of computer records) to his Rule 1001 Practice Comment (best-
evidence issue regarding summaries), and from there on to Rule 703 (which allows expert
opinion on sources not admitted into evidence, if normally relied upon by such experts).
Rothstein conflates the first two rules and then, as he says, end-runs them-by satisfying
them through the expert's testimony. See id. This practice is unlikely to succeed if the
court or opposing counsel is adequately informed.
142. I say "might be" because the courts have not cited specific paragraphs. See, e.g.,
United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86 (5th Cir. 1982).
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narcotics chain of custody.143 But no person can offer firsthand knowl-
edge of computer data processing. Perhaps a system operator can tes-
tify that the computer log indicates that a given program ran at a
particular time without any error messages. But the log itself is hear-
say and raises serious questions regarding trustworthiness. The log
could have been altered without any external indication; or data could
have been altered without a log entry; or a program could have been
changed or even run without a log entry. Indeed, any of these events
could have happened without the operator's suspicion of any extraordi-
nary occurrence. At best, testimony reiterating a computer log simply
offers a new form of circumstantial evidence of facts not susceptible to
observation-technologically produced hearsay. 144 In sum, if testimony
is taken under Rule 901(b)(1), it should not be confused with traditional
eyewitness authentication of a signature or chain of custody.
Under Rule 901(b)(9), a court may take judicial notice of the accu-
racy of a system or process. 145 But taking notice of a process' accuracy
does not mean taking notice of a particular result as accurate. In other
words, courts may take judicial notice only of the scientific principles
that justify the evidentiary use of scientifically accepted processes like
computers, radar, and handwriting identification. 146 For example,
although notice routinely is taken of the general reliability of radar to
establish automobile speed, the prosecution still must prove the accu-
racy of any given reading. 1 47 In similar fashion, although a court prop-
erly takes notice of the scientific and engineering principles underlying
computerized data processing, a particular result generated by a given
data processing system is not a proper subject for judicial notice. Any
particular printout offered as evidence must be authenticated as the ac-
curate result of a system or process. 148
143. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(1) advisory committee's note.
144. See also FED. R. EVID. 602 (requiring personal knowledge); FED. R. EvID. 703 (ba-
sis for expert opinion).
145. FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9) advisory committee's note.
146. See FED. R. EVID. 201; MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 330. Judicial notice gener-
ally requires the introduction of evidence through testimony. See, e.g., ROTHSTEIN, supra
note 70, at 37 (Aug. 1985 release).
147. The proof ordinarily includes the operator's training, as well as the device's main-
tenance and testing record. See, e.g., MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 330, at 925 n.15.
148. An offer of a particular printout also raises issues under the best evidence rule.
The best evidence rule is a rule of preference. With respect to documentary evidence, it
calls for the best evidence available. If the original is available, then it must be produced.
FED. R. EVID. 1002. If not, then its unavailability must be explained and an accurate copy
is admissible. See FED. R. EVID. 1003. If records are voluminous, then a summary is ad-
missible, as long as the underlying data are made available to the opposing party. FED. R.
EVID. 1006. A printout is never an original record in the sense that a cash register receipt
or ledger entry is original. It is a copy produced some time-days or years-after the
transaction occurred. Given the observation that computerized systems of business re-
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Current court treatment of computerized business records does not
accord with the purport of Rules 901 and 902. Neither self-authentica-
tion, eyewitness testimony, nor judicial notice represents an appropriate
way of establishing system reliability. Rather, systemic accuracy should
be authenticated under Rule 901(b)(9).
4. The Proper Relationship Between Rules 803(6) and 901(b)(9).-
Perhaps the courts' current trivialization of the authentication require-
ment can be seen as making sense under a rationale that the Rules al-
low courts to infer reliability from reliance-that qualifying a record
under the business records exception is intended to obviate the need to
prove the accuracy of the system or process that produced the record.
In considering whether that rationale describes the proper relationship
between Rules 803(6) and 901(b)(9), at least four relationships are possi-
ble in the abstract. One pair of possibilities is based on the interpreta-
tional assumption that complying with both rules would, in effect, be
proving the same issue twice. In particular, meeting the qualification
requirements of either rule automatically meets the requirements of
the other rule as well. The second pair of possibilities is based on the
interpretational assumption that the two rules are independent of one
another: that is, either both rules apply to computerized business
records and both their requirements must be met, or only the hearsay
exception applies and authentication is therefore immaterial.
The courts' current practice of inferring reliability from reliance
appears to be consistent with the premise behind the first pair of possi-
ble relationships. Indeed, several cases assert that comprehensive au-
thentication of a computer system's printouts of business records would
be redundant because it would force the proponent to prove trustwor-
thiness twice.14 9 These opinions maintain that making a prima facie
case under Rule 803(6) satisfies Rule 901 as well.150 In contrast, Colin
Tapper in his article on computer evidence infers precisely the converse
relationship from the same premise. He suggests that because the pro-
ponent's burden might be lighter under Rule 901(b)(9) than under Rule
803(6), it makes sense to allow the proponent to establish computerized
cordkeeping do not save original records and given the belief that current copying tech-
nology-whether photocopying or computer magnetic storage media-is accurate, the
Federal Rules treat printouts as originals, though they inexplicably treat magnetic tape or
disc copies as copies. See FED. R. EVD. 1001(3), (4). This makes little sense, because any
printout is usually created from data stored on magnetic tapes or discs. See generally FED.
R. EVID. 1001-1008.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Cir. 1982); Perma Research &
Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111, 125 (2d Cir.) (Van Graafeiland, J., dissenting), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976). See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at 885 n.6.
150. See, e.g., United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Cir. 1982).
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business records' trustworthiness under the lighter proof standard.15 '
Tapper bases his strategy on the premise that both rules share the same
purport-that authentication and business record status represent par-
allel paths to establishing trustworthiness. Tapper believes that offer-
ing evidence of system reliability satisfies the hearsay rule's concern for
circumstantial trustworthiness.
Although both the courts' and Tapper's versions of rule commuta-
tion are equally reasonable, neither version responds to the questions
and concerns about fairness and proper rule construction posed in ear-
lier sections. 152 In particular, neither version takes adequate account of
the power of the aura of admissibility granted computerized business
records, the extreme difficulty and expense of an opponent's burden of
simply investigating a computer system's reliability, the Rule 104(a) im-
position of a burden on the proponent regarding preliminary questions
of fact, or the Rule 803(6) proviso regarding trustworthiness. Moreover,
Rule 803 and its Advisory Committee's Notes explicitly call for in-
dependent foundation requirements. Rule 803 states that enumerated
categories of hearsay are "not excluded"; it does not state that they are
"admitted" into evidence. The Notes clarify this semantic distinction by
explaining that the exceptions listed in Rule 803(b) "are phrased in
terms of nonapplication of the hearsay rule, rather than in positive
terms of admissibility."'1 53 For example, if the document is a copy, then
the rules regarding copies and the best-evidence requirement are not
automatically satisfied by establishing that the document is a business
record.'5 But the uncertainty is not easily resolved: although Rule
803(6) and the Advisory Committee's Notes would seem to favor treat-
ing Rules 803 and 901 as independent hurdles, there remains an alterna-
tive construction of the rules that might justify the courts' position.
Current court practice also can be described as falling under the
second interpretational assumption-the proposition that qualifying a
document under Rule 803(6) does not absolve the proponent from meet-
ing other admissibility requirements. The argument is simply stated:
Not all rules apply to all evidence. For example, not all computer
printouts are summaries; if a printout is not a summary, it need not
meet the foundation elements enunciated in Rule 1006. In similar fash-
ion, the courts' current practice is consistent with the notion that
although the rules have independent requirements, Rule 901(b)(9) does
not apply to all computer printouts offered as evidence. A court might
assert that Rule 901(b)(9) is intended to apply only to those documents
151. Tapper, supra note 37, at 579.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 16-21 & 67-72.
153. FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee's note.
154. See FED. R. EVID. 1001-1006 (rules governing best evidence and summaries); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (Supp. 1984) (alternative best evidence rule for business records).
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that require proof of accuracy. Printouts of business records, whose re-
liability already is presumed from business reliance, simply do not fit
under this rule, just as they do not fit under the rule regarding summa-
ries. Only special reports of polls, econometric studies, or other kinds of
analysis that are not regularly performed and relied upon merit the
time, expense, and detailed scrutiny contemplated by Rule 901(b)(9).
Does this construction of the Rules, carved out of the general structure
of rule independence, make better sense than the construction based on
rule commutation?
The construction founded in rule commutation is, as has already
been suggested, inconsistent with the explicit language of Rule 803(6)
and its Advisory Committee's Note.' 5 It turns out that the construc-
tion intended to avoid the general mandate for rule independence also
fails. If based on the premise that Rule 901(b)(9) represents an excep-
tion to the general mandate, the courts' practice of not requiring propo-
nents of computerized business records to comply with the Rule stems
from a misguided interpretation that overlooks two prominent signposts
pointing to the proper reading. First, the Advisory Committee's Note
strongly suggests that Rule 901(b)(9) was intended to apply to business
records. The Advisory Committee's Note refers to three cases, all of
which resolved admissibility questions about computerized business
records. No other cases are cited.'5 6 Second, giving both Rule 803(6)
and Rule 901(b)(9) substantive content comports more closely with the
treatment of other complex hearsay problems in the Rules-particu-
larly the rule regarding hearsay within hearsay. 57 Both of these sign-
posts point toward a reading of the Rules that would require a more
comprehensive foundation for computerized business records, similar to
the Manual's recommended practice.
The Advisory Committee's Note includes citations to three state
court opinions that outline proper practices for qualifying computer
data as business records. 158 One of the opinions, Transport Indemnity
Co. v. Seib,159 approvingly refers to the 141 pages of trial transcript de-
155. See supra notes 101-11 and accompanying text.
156. See FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9) advisory committee's note. Can it be argued, on the
basis of the cases cited in the Advisory Committee's Note, that Rule 901(b)(9) applies only
to business record cases? That reading would disregard the Advisory Committee's Note
citation to several articles that deal with a wider range of issues than just computerized
business records. See id.
157. See FED. R. EVID. 805.
158. FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(9) advisory committee's note. It is curious that the Manual,
written by federal judges for federal judges, refers only to state court cases. No pre-Rules
federal court opinions are cited. Perhaps that silence marks the depth of the split be-
tween those two lines of federal court opinions.
159. 178 Neb. 253, 132 N.W.2d 871 (1965).
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voted to proving computer system reliability.160 Seib is juxtaposed with
two brief opinions, both of which rely simply on the circumstantial
trustworthiness of business records. 16 1 This trio of opinions recalls the
pre-Rules split among both state and federal judges and reflects the di-
lemma between need and reliability1 62 that animated those two lines of
cases. The fact that all three opinions cited deal with computerized
business records suggests that the Advisory Committee intended Rule
901(b)(9) to apply to such offers of evidence.
Although the Advisory Committee's Notes do not offer a resolution
of the cases' disparate treatment of computer records-either 141 pages
or no pages of trial transcript testimony-they nonetheless call for the
Rule's application to computerized business records. Furthermore, the
treatment of other complex hearsay problems under the Rules-partic-
ularly hearsay within hearsay-suggests that independent proof of sys-
temic reliability reflects the proper construction of Rule 901(b)(9). In
short, the business records exception in combination with system au-
thentication should comprise the two components of a comprehensive
foundation for computerized business records.
The analogy of computerized business records to hearsay within
hearsay is worth examining at some length. Rule 805 states that
"[h]earsay included within hearsay is not excluded under the hearsay
rule if each part of the combined statements conforms with an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule provided in these rules.' 63 In other words,
both the inclusive and the included statements must conform with some
hearsay exception. Generally, the process involves a two-stage inquiry.
First, does the inclusive statement qualify under some hearsay excep-
tion? If it does, then the court proceeds to the next stage. If the in-
cluded statement is offered to prove the truth of the matter stated, then
the included statement must also qualify under a hearsay exception. 164
A familiar example of hearsay within hearsay is the police officer who
testifies that X informed him that Y confessed to X that Y committed
the crime for which Y is being tried. Since both the statements by X
and Y are hearsay, both statements must qualify under some exception
to the hearsay rule. While the confession of Y qualifies as an admission
160. Id. at 257, 132 N.W.2d at 874.
161. Merrick v. United States Rubber Co., 7 Ariz. App. 433, 435-36, 440 P.2d 314, 316-17
(1968); State v. Veres, 7 Ariz. App. 117, 125-26, 436 P.2d 629, 637-38 (1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1014 (1969).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 35-38.
163. FED. R. EvID. 805.
164. FED. R. EVID. 805 advisory committee's note; see MCCORMICK, supra note 12,
§ 324.3, at 911.
[Vol. VII
COMPUTER DATA
by a party-opponent, 1 65 the informant's statement does not fall under
any exception. 1 66 Thus, the officer is not permitted to testify about
either statement.
A printout offered into evidence can be described in similar terms.
The data processing director D testifies that program X was written to
read the business records167 in files Y1 through Y10, to perform some
specified analysis, and then to write the result to file Zj; program A was
written to read file Z, and certain other files (Z 2, Z 3, and sometimes Z.),
to rearrange the information, and then to pass some of it on to other
programs that perform other functions, including program P, which
prints out selected items of information on printout E. Some of these
programs were run over a period of several weeks after the transactions
in question, while others were run the day before the witness' testi-
mony, which is some years after the transaction. Clearly, questions are
raised about program and equipment changes and testing, data and pro-
gram security, system maintenance and reliability, and personnel train-
ing and turnover. In short, should we trust the statements passed
between files and programs (created and run by data processing person-
nel X and Y) over a period of years simply because, somewhere along
the line, some version of the information was a business record? Does
D's testimony addressing only the business records exception seem ade-
quate here? Clearly not. Like the hearsay within hearsay question,
computerized processing adds another level of questionable trustworthi-
ness to already questionable hearsay-business records. Accordingly,
separate attention to systemic reliability is called for. Rule 901(b)(9) of-
fers an appropriate framework for that separate treatment.
Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. Rogers Import, Inc.,168 an unfair-com-
petition case, presents an example of qualifying hearsay within hearsay
that is even closer to the question of authenticating computerized busi-
ness records. Zippo involved a consumer survey that was intended to
show product confusion. The survey report was qualified as a business
record; the included hearsay-the interviewees' answers-was qualified
under the state of mind exception.169 Despite meeting the court's for-
mal requirements, however, the report's status as a business record was
problematic, since such polls often are undertaken in contemplation of
litigation. Nonetheless, an interesting and enduring insight emerges
from Judge Feinberg's elegant admissibility analysis, which was con-
165. See FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (admission by party-opponent excluded from the tradi-
tional category of hearsay).
166. MCCORMICK, supra note 12, at § 324.3.
167. The hypothetical makes the simplifying assumption that the initial documents
qualify as business records.
168. 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
169. Id. at 682-83. The state of mind exception is now codified as FED. R. EvID. 803(3).
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cerned more with the techniques employed in the survey than with the
business record status of the report. Indeed, the Advisory Committee's
Notes approvingly reflect Judge Feinberg's analysis: "Attention is di-
rected to the validity of the techniques employed rather than to rela-
tively fruitless inquiries whether hearsay is involved.' 1 70
As with the previous discussion of two-tiered hearsay, Judge Fein-
berg's analysis suggests that computerized business records call for scru-
tiny beyond a simplistic business records analysis. The formal category
of "business record" ultimately presents a picture that is both too par-
tial and too vague, a picture that forces inquiry into an unfamiliar and
complex process whose unavoidable potential for failure properly calls
for proof of system reliability. 171 Moreover, the court may not properly
notice unproved particulars, even if the institutional resources were
available. Judicial notice is intended to apply only to general scientific
and engineering principles underlying computer technology or to gener-
ally accepted principles of statistical analysis, but not to specified output
from particular systems or particular polls. 72
Finally, when courts have entertained the possibility of admitting
hearsay that does not seem to fit under an enumerated exception, they
have taken a number of factors into consideration, including the time
lapse between the event and the hearsay statement offered.1 73 With a
printout of computerized business records, the typical time period be-
tween the recording of the transaction, subsequent computations and
changes, storage and copying, and retrieval and printing is several
years.174 In short, both the complexity of modern data processing and
the significant time lapses between the transaction and subsequent
processing mean that computerized business records present complex
hearsay problems that, like the multiple levels of hearsay within hear-
say, call for independent and substantial Rule 901(b)(9) authentication.
To summarize, a proper reading of the Rules demands the kind of
comprehensive foundation recommended by the Manual. Two aspects
of computerization should be recognized as affecting the circumstantial
trustworthiness of business records: not only the technological and pro-
cedural complexity, but also the extended time lapses between the orig-
inal transaction, subsequent processing, and ultimate printout create
significant risks of error.175 Accordingly, the current practice of simply
170. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
171. See infra text accompanying notes 176-213.
172. See supra text accompanying note 148.
173. See FED. R. EvID. 803(24); see also MCCORMICK, supra note 12, § 324.1, at 908 n.11
and cases therein.
174. The relative reliability of the system is also open to question. See supra text ac-
companying notes 129-33.
175. For a discussion of such risks of error, see infra text accompanying notes 176-213.
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qualifying a printout of computer-maintained business data under the
business records exception does not attain the high degree of trustwor-
thiness contemplated under the Rules. In light of this demand for
trustworthiness, the courts' current trivialization of authentication ap-
pears mistaken.
Current judicial practice proves even more problematic when as-
sessed under Rules 901 and 902, because self-authentication, eyewitness
testimony, and judicial notice are all inappropriate. Moreover, because
the Rules explicitly maintain that each rule's particular qualification re-
quirements are independent of all others, meeting the business record
standard under Rule 803(6) does not absolve the proponent from au-
thenticating the system under Rule 901(b)(9). The propriety of that
practice is corroborated not only by the Advisory Committee's Note for
Rule 901(b)(9), which refers only to opinions dealing with computerized
business records, but also by treatment of other complex hearsay
problems, particularly Rule 805 qualification of hearsay within hearsay.
B. AN ASSESSMENT OF EXPERIENCE: THE LIMITS OF COMPUTER
RELIABILITY
Another kind of analysis, an assessment of experience, also calls
upon the courts to scrutinize computerized business records more
closely. Trial judges should require a more comprehensive foundation,
not only because the current practice is both unfair to the party oppos-
ing admission and inconsistent with a proper reading of the Rules, but
also because it takes inadequate account of the practical limitations of
complex technology. This section focuses on four limits of computer
system reliability: System security, user expertise, industry marketing
practices, and the process of conversion.176 Although all four subjects
(and others) can limit the reliability of any computer system, system se-
curity and user expertise are discussed within the context of small sys-
tems-personal computers-while marketing practices and conversion
problems are analyzed within the context of large systems. The catego-
rization scheme not only allows these problems to be discussed in their
most commonly occurring environment, but also permits analysis of two
major forms of data processing technology.177
176. By conversion, I mean changing (that is, converting) programs and data to render
them functional in another hardware or software environment.
177. Although a number of commentators use schemes like hardware/software or
human/machine error to identify errors, these distinctions are not very useful because of
the overlap between hardware and software, and because programming, operation, manu-
facture, and design are all ultimately done by humans or according to models designed by
humans.
19861
COMPUTER/LAW JOURNAL
1. Small Computers: System Security and User Expertise.-When
I worked as a systems engineer for RCA some fifteen years ago, my re-
sponsibilities included supervision of a customer's computer, then con-
sidered medium-sized, which filled a 1400-square foot, air-conditioned
room in the basement of a high-rise office building. For a monthly
rental charge of approximately $7500, the customer had unlimited use
of a central processing unit with 256K of main memory, four tape
drives, four disc drives, two printers, DOS software, and me. Today, a
more powerful system can fit on a desktop and can be purchased for sig-
nificantly less than the $7,500 RCA charged for one month's rent. The
substantial decreases in computer system size and price, particularly
within the last five years, have created new system security problems
and have expanded the customer population to include smaller and less
knowledgeable users.178 As a result, today's newer technology raises
questions of reliability different from those of its predecessors.
With physically large computer systems, thousands of square feet
must be specially prepared, 1 79 environmentally controlled, 80 and dedi-
cated to housing computer hardware and supplies. In addition, offices,
conference rooms, and common work areas for operations, program-
ming, and systems support personnel typically are nearby.' 8 ' Magnetic
tape archives house years of historical information. Simply the size of
such data processing operations, still common but no longer universal
today, requires a firm to organize and control access to system compo-
nents and workspace areas.
Although such environments continue to suffer security problems
despite the availability of inexpensive safeguards and the passage of fed-
eral criminal legislation,18 2 personal computers (PCs) present even
178. I do not talk about the middle category-minicomputers. In many respects, they
combine both the strengths and weaknesses of mainframes and personal computers (PCs).
In 1977, a minicomputer was defined as a complete, general-purpose computing system
whose processing unit and main memory (ROM) cost no more than $25,000. D. BENDER,
COMPUTER LAW 1-13 (1977). Similar systems sell today as PCs for less than 10% of that
price ceiling.
179. Large computer systems, for example, may require false floors to run cables,
electrical circuits with voltage fluctuation control, and power-outage protection.
180. Temperature, humidity, dust, and magnetic field forces must all be controlled.
181. But access between such areas typically is controlled, because both functional and
physical separation are recommended as security measures.
182. See Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, 18
U.S.C. § 1030 (Supp. 1985). See generally A. BEQUAI, COMPUTER CRIME (1978); Taber, A
Survey of Computer Crime Studies, 2 COMPUTER L.J. 275 (1980).
Although passwords or other codes would seem to make a significant difference, they
usually are ineffective in deterring unauthorized access to computer systems. The many
reasons include a password's typical longevity, its careless handling by users, its vulnera-
bility to interception over communications (telephone) links, and its frequent accessibility
in a system dictionary of passwords. One-time passwords offer a far superior alternative,
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greater problems. Three developments contribute to the increased diffi-
culty of controlling access to business records stored, maintained, or ac-
cessible by personal computer. First, physical access is easier because
PCs often occupy desktops in common areas or in clerical or secretarial
workspace. As a result, both the PCs and the data, often kept on cas-
sette tapes or (floppy) discs at deskside, are more susceptible to unau-
thorized change, extraordinary access, or environmental effects.
Second, because PCs are easily tied into several varieties of com-
plex networks, system security is no longer an internal problem.
Although the best-known instance of unauthorized access is the "Mil-
waukee 14" case of high schoolers' entry into sensitive medical and re-
stricted governmental databases, precipitating FBI confiscations,
"hackers'" testimony before congressional committees, and federal
crime legislation,18 3 less spectacular and less visible intrusions occur
regularly. Indeed, many businesses neither publicize nor report many
instances of unauthorized access.' 8 4 Whether a PC is connected to an-
other PC, to a database hundreds of feet or hundreds of miles away, or
to a large computer system, whether directly or by telephone, network-
ing means that security procedures are more difficult to define and con-
trol, that access is more difficult to record or limit, and that
accountability has less institutional force than with large systems. As a
result, data are less reliable. These circumstances raise even greater
concerns when parties join issue over the information maintained by
such systems. Unlike the scrivened entries of traditional shop books,
changes or errors in computerized business records are not conspicuous,
and unlike large computer systems, with limited physical access, PCs
linked to networks or databases are subject to complex and remote se-
curity problems.
The third development that has exacerbated the problem of system
insecurity is "canned" software-that is, prewritten, mass-marketed
programs that perform functions like inventory control, maintaining ac-
counts payable and receivable, or even word processing, without requir-
ing any sort of computer expertise. Because the operation of such
programs is widely known or easily learned, few barriers must be over-
but are uncommon. See, e.g., Wong, One-Time Passwords Fortify System Security, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Dec. 23, 1985, at 31.
183. See, e.g., Kleiman, Hospital in City Reports Computer Tampering, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 19, 1983, at 1, col. 2; Treaster, Trial and Error by Intruders Led to Entry into Com-
puters, N.Y. Times, Aug. 23, 1983, at 1, col. 5.
184. One estimate is that only 1% of computer crimes are even detected. The Federal
Computer Systems Protection Act: Hearings on § 1766 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal
Laws and Procedures of the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978) (statement of Senator
Biden) (estimate attributed to Professor August Bequai of American University Law
School).
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come to access PCs and databases. In combination, easy physical access,
the proliferation of computer networks, and mass-marketed software
raise serious and unanswered questions about computer system security,
and thus about the trustworthiness of information, including business
records, maintained on small computer systems.
The burgeoning cottage industry of producing "canned" software is
an expected entrepreneurial response as well as an attraction to smaller
and less knowledgeable customers, who can now computerize their in-
formation management functions at very low cost. That affordability is
even greater due to the PC's declining purchase price and the minimal
amount of investment required for workspace, supplies, and skilled per-
sonnel. PCs and canned software can obviate the need for experienced
computer operators, programmers, and systems analysts. Running a
computer has become very much like driving an automobile with auto-
matic transmission: just a few simple steps and you're on your way.
You don't have to be an auto mechanic until something goes awry, but
then you'd better know a good one.
The developing market in PCs invites reliance and creates a knowl-
edge gap, an increasing disparity between user and supplier that has
detrimental effects on computer system reliability. The user is less
likely to recognize certain kinds of error 1 85 and less capable of doing
anything to rectify conditions causing recognized errors. The first re-
sponse to an error is to try the software again. If reruns result in the
same error, a supplier's advice or intervention is sought. Certainly this
course of conduct is a reasonable one. But unlike the typical transac-
tion between the owner of a large system and one supplier, the PC
purchase resembles a consumer transaction. Retailers and distributors
stand between the users and the producers. Further, the hardware and
software suppliers are more commonly independent parties. Who does
the user contact for assistance-the retailer across town, the hardware
suppler in California, or the software company in Massachusetts? Not
only are two of the parties contacted in the form of faceless long dis-
tance calls, but all three parties stand in adversarial positions when
something has gone wrong: each knowledgeably and somewhat con-
vincingly explains why one of the others must be contacted to solve the
problem.'8 6 Even if the problem is eventually solved or patched for fu-
185. For example, a less knowledgeable user might not recognize transient errors-
that is, random errors caused by marginal hardware. He might think that the error was
his own and simply try again. The current effects of transient errors on data and the
ever-increasing risk of catastrophic failure might not be appreciated.
186. For a highly unusual circumstance-recovery against the manufacturer after set-
tlement with the software vendor-see Convoy Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 672 F.2d 781
(9th Cir. 1982).
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ture use, significant time has passed, and data accuracy probably has
suffered in the interim.
Should proponents of computerized business records be required to
offer evidence of system reliability, of procedures to protect data during
unavoidable system errors, whether attributed to hardware, software, or
more directly to human beings? The question is not whether errors will
occur, but rather what has been done to minimize their impact. With
small systems, lower levels of user sophistication in combination with
the increased complexity of system security may well have an effect on
system reliability and data accuracy, and therefore call for close scru-
tiny of business records so maintained or accessed. Courts should de-
mand more comprehensive foundations for their admissibility.
2. Large Systems: Marketing Practices and the Process of Conver-
sion.-Most of us are less familiar with the workings of large computer
systems but more cognizant of their susceptibility to fraudulent manip-
ulation or to unintended error. The Equity Funding case has become
synonymous with computer fraud on a grand scale.'8 7 More recently,
the tale of the Internal Revenue Service tape portrays the staggering
consequences of a computer's inability to read one record.'8 8 Because a
magnetic tape had faulty coding on its first record-its label or identi-
fier-the IRS National Computer Center system could not process it.
Although the National Center requested a replacement tape from its
Philadelphia regional processing center, none was forthcoming. More-
over, after an IRS computer expert attempted to create a new label (a
simple task), the tape still would not run. According to IRS Commis-
sioner Roscoe Egger, the new tape probably would not run because
some data were lost in the relabelling process.'8 9 Consequently, pay-
ment information regarding 26,000 taxpayers and $300 million was not
posted for over three months. No one intervened in the computerized
procedure, which sent notices to the 26,000 taxpayers, and IRS person-
nel were less than cooperative, when available, in responding to inquir-
ies and attempts to offer corroborating evidence of payment in order to
cut short the agency process of dealing with delinquent taxpayers.190
In his testimony at a hearing of the House Ways and Means Com-
mittee's Subcommittee on (IRS) Oversight, Commissioner Egger also
mentioned in passing that IRS employees' preoccupation with the Ser-
vice Center Replacement Program contributed indirectly to the inci-
187. See supra note 4.
188. Numerous articles have appeared. See, e.g., COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 18, 1985, at 15;
Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 30, 1985, at 1, col. 5.
189. COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 18, 1985, at 15.
190. Philadelphia Inquirer, Apr. 30, 1985, at 1, col. 5. Bell Atlantic diverted millions of
calls in order to avoid gridlocking the regional telephone circuits.
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dent.19 1 In other words, data processing personnel were so absorbed in
the massive project of replacing the center's hardware and software
that they spent little time and energy on the system's day-to-day
processing. Although that might seem a weak excuse to anyone who
has never participated in a system conversion, it brings back images of
working all night, sleeping on cots, and weeks of fast food to those of us
who have converted or installed computer systems.192 In short, the typ-
ical conversion scenario could be mistaken for finals week after a se-
mester of studied neglect. Even if the IRS Replacement Program
includes no new software applications, much time and effort are none-
theless necessary. Because the project includes hardware replacement,
current software and data probably require substantial conversion in or-
der to run properly on the new equipment.
To conclude this brief investigation into four practical limitations of
computer technology, this subsection looks at the problem of conversion
and at the marketing practices that sometimes precipitate replacement
of large systems. The context for this analysis derives from a sampling
of recently reported cases and from my representation of the plaintiff in
a prolonged and sometimes bitter lawsuit claiming that a major com-
puter manufacturer made misrepresentations in order to induce the
plaintiff to enter into an agreement to lease computer equipment,
software, and support services. 1 93
The Government Employees Credit Union (GECU), the largest em-
ployee credit union in Texas, computerized its operation in the mid-
1960s with the installation of a Univac system. As its customer base
grew, GECU expanded its data processing capabilities by adding equip-
ment and later by upgrading to larger and newer Univac computer sys-
tems. In early 1975, Univac convinced GECU to convert its operations
to Univac's most powerful operating system. 94 Announced shortly
191. COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 18, 1985, at 15.
192. That statement derives from my personal experience and from statements of
other systems analysts some 15 years ago. Apparently, the experience today has not
changed appreciably. See inqfra text accompanying notes 210-13.
193. Of counsel to the plaintiff in Government Employees Credit Union v. Sperry
Rand Corp., No. SA-78-260 (W.D. Tex.) (settled by agreement of the parties on July 1,
1982). All facts in this Article pertaining to the foregoing lawsuit derive from conversa-
tions with GECU employees and representatives, GECU documents, Univac marketing
and other materials in the public domain, and my familiarity with the computer industry.
No facts derive from documents produced by Univac or depositions of Univac employees
or representatives.
194. The operating system was intended for Univac's mid-sized mainframe computers.
By operating system, I mean software that controls the execution of applications pro-
grams such as inventory control, payroll, or word processing. A traffic cop of sorts, an
operating system may also provide scheduling, debugging, input/output control, account-
ing, compilation, storage assignment, and related services. See AMERICAN NATIONAL DIC-
TIONARY FOR INFORMATION PROCESSING (Am. Nat'l Stands. Inst. 1977).
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before the decision to convert, the software for the operating system
was based on the concept of "virtual resources" first developed in the
mid-1960s by RCA and IBM.1 95
Univac's announcement was not a surprise to those familiar with
the industry because Univac had acquired RCA's customer base, includ-
ing a significant number of virtual resource operating system customers,
and some research and development assets in 1972. Thus, in 1975, in its
glossy marketing literature and its proposal to GECU, Univac repre-
sented its "new" operating system as an "old" product, proven and cus-
tomer-tested since the late 1960s-that is, as the already developed and
tested RCA system. What was really new, Univac announced, was its
more powerful and more sophisticated hardware. The combination of
proven software and better hardware seemed to be a good strategy for
maximizing output from limited (that is, expensive) physical resources.
In practice, the strategy was an abysmal failure, not only with
GECU, but also with two customers who filed lawsuits against Univac
in Michigan and California, as well as other customers who replaced
their Univac systems. For anyone familiar with the trends in hardware
design at that time, the cause of the failure was clear. Because Univac's
new hardware was different from the older RCA equipment, the RCA
software simply would not work without some revision. Significant por-
tions of the software must have been revised and were actually new
software-even newer than the equipment it was written to control.
Marketing practices like those of Univac have not been unusual in
the computer industry. When I was a professional systems engineer,
selling "futures" was an unspoken industry practice, particularly re-
garding software. In other words, software was often written shortly
before or even after its sale, though it was sometimes represented as al-
ready completed and tested. Perhaps the classic case of selling futures
195. Virtual resources software allows computer users to design and run programs
whose requirements exceed the system's physical capabilities. For example, programs
that ordinarily would require 128K of memory can perform their tasks in 64K, if that is
what is available. Thus, two 128K programs can run at the same time, even though each
of them typically would require the computer's entire memory. Moreover, user personnel
need do nothing to accomplish this doubling of system capability. The operating system
allows the user to process data as if memory were virtually limitless, by partitioning pro-
grams into smaller segments and loading into memory only those segments currently
needed. Other segments are stored on very fast disc drives until needed. In similar fash-
ion, two programs, each of which requires a printer, can run simultaneously, even though
the system has only one printer, because the operating system creates a "virtual printer."
That is, it diverts one program's output to a disc file until the other program has con-
cluded, and the printer is available. Although such swapping is less cost-effective now
that memory is so cheap, many PCs, particularly those using CP/M software, have the
capability and use it to the extent necessary.
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is United States v. Wegematic Corp. 196 During precontractual negotia-
tions, Wegematic promised a revolutionary system. 197 When the neces-
sary technological breakthroughs were not made, it attempted to back
out of the agreement based on a claim of impossibility.'9 8 The court
rightfully found that Wegematic assumed the risk of its representa-
tions.199 That attitude of "best efforts" always being good enough,
whether or not successful, however, is common fare in the computer
industry.200
A number of reported opinions involving Burroughs Corporation
address similar practices. In Beaver Insurance Co. v. Burroughs
Corp. ,201 for example, the jury found that Burroughs deliberately had
overstated the capabilities of its B800 machine. Moreover, it was alleged
that Burroughs knew about serious internal memory problems, but de-
livered and installed the machine anyway. During the first several
months of operation, the machine was inoperative roughly forty percent
of the time. The jury awarded Beaver Insurance $783,500 in damages. 20 2
Several suits have been brought against NCR based on similar
claims. In Glovatorium, Inc. v. NCR,20 3 the plaintiff purchased a com-
puter that ran so slowly that some calculations could be done more
quickly by hand. Not only was NCR aware of system defects and limi-
tations, but Glovatorium proved that NCR performed sales demonstra-
tions on systems covertly enhanced to run faster than the models being
marketed and sold.204 Although the court rightfully found intentional
misrepresentation, NCR certainly was working on the problems re-
ported, and from their point of view, they were selling "futures." They
196. 360 F.2d 674 (2d Cir. 1966).
197. Id. at 674-75.
198. Id. at 675.
199. Id. at 676-77.
200. See F & M Schaefer Corp. v. Electronic Data Sys. Corp., 430 F. Supp. 988
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) (action for breach of contract based on poor equipment performance),
aff'd, 614 F.2d 1286 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 829 (1980); IBM v. Catamore En-
ters., Inc. 548 F.2d 1065 (1st Cir. 1976) (customer filed counterclaim against IBM for fail-
ure to complete and deliver merchandise control system), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 960 (1977);
Sanitary Linen Servs. v. Alexander Proudfoot Co., 304 F. Supp. 339 (S.D. Fla. 1969)
(promising and failing to supply a "workable system" with substantial savings), aff'd, 435
F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1970).
201. COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 4, 1985, at 1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 1985); see also Iten Leasing
Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 684 F.2d 573 (8th Cir. 1982); Earman Oil Co. v. Burroughs Corp.,
625 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1980).
202. COMPUTERWORLD, Mar. 4, 1985 at 1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 22, 1985).
203. 684 F.2d 658 (9th Cir. 1982); see also Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. NCR, 479 F. Supp. 738
(D.N.J. 1979), aff'd in part and remanded in part, 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. de-
nied, 457 U.S. 1112 (1982). For a bibliography of litigation, see Walker, Computer Litiga-
tion and the Manufacturer's Defenses against Fraud, 3 COMPUTER L.J. 427 (1982).
204. Glovatorium, 684 F.2d at 660-62.
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anticipated that the system problems would be resolved.20 5
Similarly, in Dunn Appraisal v. Honeywell Information Systems,20 6
Honeywell was found liable for fraudulent misrepresentation during its
initial Cleveland-area marketing of a new system. In response to a cus-
tomer's concern about purchasing a new system that would require the
conversion of 400 programs written to run on the system to be replaced,
Honeywell representatives, eager to place the first new machine in
northern Ohio, assured Dunn that Honeywell would convert all of the
programs. When Honeywell presented the written sales agreement,
Dunn questioned a provision stating that Honeywell would convert only
250 programs. The salespeople again assured Dunn employees that the
provision was included only to satisfy Honeywell's front office and that
all 400 programs would indeed be converted. With a signed contract in
hand, Honeywell subsequently refused to convert the last 150 pro-
grams.20 7 Moreover, the 250 programs converted turned out to be an
"unmitigated disaster. '20 8 Dunn was awarded actual and punitive dam-
ages, as well as attorneys' fees.209
Although large-system users usually have in-house expertise, they
still must rely on computer system suppliers for new product informa-
tion and for conversion of their existing programs, in large part because
the new technology is outside the experience of customer personnel.210
The system users' reliance can lead to adverse consequences. In the
GECU case, for example, Univac's conversion efforts were disastrous.
Disc drives and tape drives suddenly would stop during processing.
Such "silent deaths" often would necessitate the rebuilding of large
data files, followed by reprocessing of programs that had been running
for hours. The entire system sometimes would come to a halt when a
printer cabinet was opened to change paper. One horrible month, the
computer broke down seventy-two times; it never broke down less than
once a day.21 1 Even after Univac sent a special team of experts to solve
program conversion and hardware installation problems, GECU person-
205. See id. In GECU, Univac attempted to solve similar problems by installing, free of
current charges, almost twice the amount of hardware originally recommended.
206. 687 F.2d 877 (6th Cir. 1982).
207. Id. at 879-80.
208. Id. at 879.
209. Id. at 881; see also Clements Auto Co. v. Service Bureau Corp. 444 F.2d 169 (8th
Cir. 1971) (liability based on innocent misrepresentation); Ford Motor Credit Co. v.
Swarens, 447 S.W.2d 53 (Ky. 1969) (negligent overreliance on computer); Palmer v. Co-
lumbia Gas Co., 342 F. Supp. 241 (M.D. Ohio 1972), aff'd, 479 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1973),
modified by Turner v. Impala Motors, Inc., 503 F.2d 607 (6th Cir. 1974) (42 U.S.C. § 1983
claim based on computer-generated utility service termination).
210. See, e.g., Strand v. Librascope, Inc., 197 F. Supp. 743, 753 (E.D. Mich. 1961).
211. The figure is based on monthly averaging. In other words, the system could have
crashed twice on Monday but not on Tuesday.
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nel worked long hours and weekends, slept on cots, and endured
months of unprofessional treatment; some were even fired based on
Univac personnel's complaints of incompetency.212
Although the tensions of prolonged system unreliability served to
obfuscate the underlying pattern, 20-20 hindsight allows for clear recog-
nition of the symptoms' common origin: the new Univac hardware and
old RCA (or perhaps inadequately rewritten) software were incompati-
ble in significant ways. Take for example the "silent deaths" of the disc
drives. Most likely, some sort of error occurred in attempting to read or
write information-not an uncommon event in the life of a magnetic
disc or tape.213 If the Univac hardware was designed and properly man-
ufactured to recognize such error, it would pass an error message to the
RCA (or inadequately rewritten) software. The ensuing silence was
probably a language barrier: the message, written in Univac-ese, was
not intelligible to software written to expect RCA-ese. The conse-
quence was "silent death." GECU personnel, unfamiliar with the
software's life cycle, could not be expected to recognize such problems.
Apparently, Univac's people also did not recognize the problem or could
not implement the appropriate changes.
The longrunning GECU conversion disaster can be traced in the
following pattern of events. First, the computer system serves a large
number of branch offices all over the state of Texas. Each branch has a
teller terminal that communicates with the central system over tele-
phone lines. These connection allow for immediate account information
and updating. Under the old Univac system, data entry errors at the
teller terminals were anticipated and did not disrupt overall system
processing. Such errors should have been handled quickly and easily,
because they were undoubtedly commonplace-for example, acciden-
tally entering a letter into an all-numeric account number field. Usu-
ally, the system software is written to monitor such fields and upon
recognizing a nonnumeric character, to request the terminal operator to
resubmit the data item. Not only did the new system fail to perform
such checks, but the entire system, including all teller terminals in the
state, often crashed to a halt as a result of data entry errors. Since
GECU's programs and the teller terminals had not changed, something
in Univac's new system must have changed. Given Univac's expertise, it
should have been able to convert GECU's programs or advise GECU's
personnel on making appropriate changes. Instead, the problems per-
sisted for over a year until the system was replaced.
As published opinions and periodicals attest, neither Univac's mar-
212. The terminated employees were later rehired when GECU changed over to an-
other manufacturer's system.
213. See supra text accompanying notes 188-92.
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keting strategy nor GECU's disastrous conversion experience is an iso-
lated occurrence. Large systems like GECU's, or like the IRS'
monstrous computer facilities, regularly if not constantly produce unre-
liable results. In combination with system security problems and une-
ven levels of expertise, both large and small computer systems do not
merit the presumption of reliability awarded under the Federal Rules
of Evidence. Whether or not computer data fall under the category of
business records, substantial questions of trustworthiness remain. Fed-
eral courts should require proponents of computerized business records
to carry a burden of proving computer system reliability as part of the
foundation for qualification.
V. Conclusion
Reported cases as well as the limitations of computer technology
advise against embracing the popular vision of computerized perfection.
Even if the goal is perfectly reliable electronic repetition of uncompli-
cated bookkeeping tasks, its achievement is not automatic. Still, my
emphasizing that fact should not be mistaken as calling for a shutdown
of the nation's business practices. As the Tenth Circuit has stated,
"[H]olding a company responsible for the actions of its computer does
not exhibit a distaste for modern business practice.... A computer op-
erates only in accordance with the information and directions supplied
by its human programmers. ' '214
In short, neither a naive faith in technology nor Luddite sentiments
214. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bockhorst, 453 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1972).
I do not take up in this Article any philosophy of science questions associated with
the formal and mathematical presuppositions of computer system design and implementa-
tion. For example, here I mention only briefly the implications of Kurt Gdel's work.
See, e.g., Davis, What is Computation?, in MATHEMATICS TODAY 261-69 (L.A. Steen ed.
1980); E. NAGEL & J.R. NEWMAN, GODEL'S PROOF (1958). See generally D. HOFSTADTER,
K. GODEL, ESCHER & BACH: AN ETERNAL GOLDEN BRAID (1980).
Some sixty years ago, mathematician and logician Kurt Giidel published his Incom-
pleteness Theorem, a demonstration of the necessary incompleteness of sound formal sys-
tems, a project whose importance the community of theoretical mathematicians and
philosophers did not recognize for many years. Computers are designed and programmed
as if Gidel had never exposed the distressing limitations of Bertrand Russell's neo-Pla-
tonic vision of mathematics as the only pure ideal for all of our less precise and thus less
aesthetically pleasing practices-philosophy or law, for example. Russell's idealism crum-
bled under the weight of G6del's Theorem. The world of numbers and sets turns out to
be less than perfectly predictable. Even the purest abstraction cannot provide the vehicle
for returning to a philosophical or empirical Eden-to the nominalist's Garden of stability
and control. Yet most of us embrace science as having falsified Nietzsche's unnerving
claim that final authority for any proposition is ultimately unavailable-that God is dead.
Cf. Serres, The Algebra of Literature: The Wolf's Game, in TEXTUAL STRATEGIES 260 (J.
Harari ed. 1979) (portraying western metaphysics as sets of ordering principles, derived
from and serving the discourse of science). On a more practical level, computers cannot,
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in favor of machine-breaking can underwrite the constructive changes
needed. Thus, my interest is pragmatic. Computers provide an illusory
basis for shortcircuiting traditional legal processes because they cannot
be isolated from the people who build and run them. They simply can-
not guarantee error-free processing. A realistic assessment of the limi-
tations of computer technology reinforces this Article's ethical and
statutory arguments, which call for the proponent to carry a more com-
prehensive burden to qualify computerized business records. In sum,
not only our experience with computers, but also a strong sense of fair-
ness and a close reading of the Federal Rules of Evidence call upon fed-
eral judges to require proof of computer system reliability.
Some years ago, Joseph Weizenbaum, a Professor of Computer Sci-
ence at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, wrote ELIZA, a com-
puter program capable of simulating a limited conversation with a
human being through the medium of a video screen and keyboard.
Written in one of the "Artificial Intelligence" programming languages,
Weizenbaum's program analyzes a person's keyboard input to generate
data for its next response. In a limited sense, ELIZA "learns" as the
session proceeds. More specifically, the program was written to play the
part of a Rogerian psychotherapist by treating the person's typed-in re-
sponses as if they were given in the context of psychotherapy. 215 A sig-
nificant number of Weizenbaum's co-workers, practicing therapists, and
others hailed the program as a breakthrough in lowering the cost, and
thus the availability, of therapy. A concomitant of these rave reviews
was the program's anthropomorphization. Weizenbaum's secretary, for
example, who earlier had helped him enter the program instructions
into the computer, asked him to leave the room when she "conversed"
with the program. She wanted privacy for sessions with her "thera-
pist. '216 Weizenbaum's deep distress at this course of events impelled
him to write Computer Power and Human Reason to articulate his be-
liefs about the limitations of instrumental reason.217
even in theory, fulfill our desires of technologized perfection. See Davis, supra. And that
does not begin to consider our material and human frailties.
215. The therapy technique is nondirective; that is, the analyst's responses are open
ended. Typical responses to "I am angry at my brother" would be "Why are you angry
with your brother?," or "Your brother?," or simply "Oh, really?" J. WEIZENBAUM, COM-
PUTER POWER AND HUMAN REASON 3, 4 (1976).
216. Id. at 6, 7.
217. J. WEIZENBAUM, supra note 215; see also J. HABERMAS, TOWARD A RATIONAL SOCI-
ETY 62-80 (1970) (describing the scientization of politics and public opinion). For an argu-
ment against Weizenbaum's position and in favor of the view that artificial intelligence
research offers a pathway into the workings of the human mind, see M. BODEN, ARTIFI-
CIAL INTELLIGENCE AND NATURAL MAN (1977); cf. D. HOFSTADTER, supra note 214. For
arguments consistent with Weizenbaum's position, but founded in Gestalt psychology and
phenomenological existentialism, see H. DREYFUS, WHAT COMPUTERS CAN'T DO (1979).
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In short, Weizenbaum is as much concerned with our electronic
self-images, reflections of ourselves as axonic circuitry, as he is with the
startling humanization of ELIZA. We should not, he would agree, judge
ourselves and all that we do based on computer technology as our ideal
image. Human reason encompasses greater possibilities than the lim-
ited paths engineered and programmed through micrologic gates.218
Moreover, to grant greater credibility to computerized records, as did
the court in Vela, because they have not been touched by "the hand of
man" 219 succumbs to two delusions. First, it is the hands and intellects
of men and women that produce computers and the programs that
guide them. To believe that the absence of direct physical contact
means that records are untouched betrays a naive view of electronic
data processing, one that ignores the centrality of humans to any com-
puter system's functioning. Second, trustworthiness is equated with
electronic processing and opposed to human reckoning. This troubling
view of the computer as an ideal that human beings should emulate but
cannot achieve not only exemplifies Weizenbaum's fear about imposing
an electronic standard to judge the human condition, but also subordi-
nates the human reason in traditional practices like in-court testimony
and cross-examination. It ignores, for example, the great dangers of
traceless change and unauthorized access, as well as the benefits of hav-
ing the proponent present evidence to prove systemic accuracy.
Even if we can, do we really want to eliminate or subordinate "the
hand of man"? 220 Having suggested that the possibility of somehow
freeing complex technology from human intelligence and governance as
both delusory and pernicious, I will conclude with a few remarks about
the question of subordination, about the desire for technological
governance.
Throughout law's intellectual history, scholars and jurists have
sought methodological objectivity to justify legal decisionmaking. 22 '
Whether the nineteenth-century Formalists' belief in a deductive legal
logic that guarantees consistent concrete results from general princi-
ples 222 or the contemporary Price Theorists' faith in a logic of effi-
ciency, 223 legal writers have essayed theories purporting to bridle the
218. J. WEIZENBAUM, supra note 215, at 9-16; cf. H. DREYFUS, supra note 217.
219. United States v. Vela, 673 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Cir. 1982).
220. For an analysis of similar sentiments underlying the law and economics move-
ment, see Leff, Economic Analysis of Law: Some Realism about Nominalism, 60 VA. L.
REV. 451, 459 (1974) (reviewing R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1973)).
221. See, e.g., Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1277 (1984).
222. See, e.g., O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (M. Howe ed. 1963) (the life of the
law has not been logic).
223. For a critique within the context of antitrust law, see Peritz, The Predicament of
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discretion of governmental intermediaries, whether judge, administra-
tor, or police officer. The jurisprudential lure of computer technology is
a perceived absence of discretion. Once designed, built, and program-
med, the machinery objectively executes the will of its creators, and
thus is perceived as trustworthy. But closer scrutiny reveals, at best, a
paradox of complete submission and complete autonomy. A computer
performs relentlessly just as we have designed and programmed it, and
in so doing, it is entirely independent of us. Computerized records also
are treated as trustworthy for a second reason-because the technology
is perceived as error-free. Moreover, even on those exceptional occa-
sions of technological failure, we believe, a computer will still inform us
that an error has occurred. In sum, we have come to believe that unac-
knowledged error and subjectivity are not only undesirable, but also in-
digenous to the human domain.
But experience can teach us that such idealization of technology is
a mirage that obfuscates the overlapping horizons of humans and com-
puters, as well as their distinctive characteristics. In the human drama
of litigation, better attention to the pragmatic jurisprudence of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, as well as to the thoughtful practice recom-
mended by the Manual for Complex Litigation, can help to dispel such
harmful illusions. The concrete result of this attention will be the ex-
tension to the objecting party and to the court of a fair opportunity to
evaluate the trustworthiness of all documents generated from comput-
erized data.
Antitrust Jurisprudence: Economics and the Monopolization of Price Discrimination Ar-
gument, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1205.
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